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On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 




Using CSR ratings for 23,000 companies from 114 countries, we find that a firm’s corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) rating and its country’s legal origin are strongly correlated. Legal origin is a 
stronger explanation than “doing good by doing well” factors or firm and country characteristics 
(ownership concentration, political institutions, and globalization): firms from common law countries 
have lower CSR than companies from civil law countries, with Scandinavian civil law firms having 
the highest CSR ratings. Evidence from quasi-natural experiments such as scandals and natural 
disasters suggests that civil law firms are more responsive to CSR shocks than common law firms. 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, legal origins, stakeholder orientation. 
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The classical view in finance on modern corporations takes a shareholder value maximization perspective, 
which holds that corporations are accountable only to profit-maximizing shareholders, and apart from their 
contractually determined obligations, have no responsibility to serve other stakeholders’ interests or to 
enhance society’s welfare (Friedman (1970), Benabou and Tirole (2010)). In reality, however, corporations 
often focus on objectives beyond profit maximization and participate in activities that improve other 
stakeholders’ welfare, such as providing employee benefits, investing in environment-friendly production 
processes, selecting suppliers that avoid the use of child labor, and organizing projects to help the poor in 
less-developed countries. Indeed, corporate social responsibility (CSR), a term frequently used to describe 
such stakeholder-oriented behaviors, has increasingly become a mainstream business activity (Kitzmueller and 
Shimshack (2012)). This raises the question of why do some firms want to be socially responsible rather than 
pure profit maximizers, and more importantly, why firms in some countries engage in CSR to a greater extent 
than firms in other countries. 
The common explanation for why companies invest in CSR is that doing so enhances profitability and 
firm value,
1
 a relationship often referred to as “doing well by doing good” (e.g., Dowell, Hart, and Yeung 
(2000), Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes (2003), Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008, 2011), Guenster et al. 
(2011), Deng, Kang, and Low (2013), Flammer (2015), Krueger (2015), Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2015)). 
Other studies consider the inverse, that is, “doing good by doing well,” by examining whether it is only 
well-performing firms that can afford to invest in CSR (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman (2012)). However, 
neither of these “doing good—doing well” arguments can explain the cross-firm or cross-country variation in 
CSR. For instance, if on average CSR enhances firm value, why do some companies adopt a CSR-oriented 
strategy whereas others do so to a lesser extent, and why do companies in some countries systematically 
invest more in CSR than companies in other countries? In addition, these “doing good—doing well” 
arguments mostly take CSR to be a voluntary initiative. Extant studies also usually take only one perspective 
on CSR, such as employee satisfaction (Edmans (2011, 2012), Edmans, Li, and Zhang (2014)), environmental 
protection (e.g., Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000), Konar and Cohen (2001)), corporate philanthropy (e.g., 
Seifert, Morris, and Bartkus (2004), Masulis and Reza (2015), Liang and Renneboog (2016)), or consumer 
satisfaction (e.g., Luo and Bhattacharya (2006), Servaes and Tamayo (2013)), and test CSR relations for only 
one country (typically the U.S.). However, CSR spans multiple dimensions of firm behavior and captures a 
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firm’s effort to address various externalities that it generates in the process of pursuing profit maximization 
(Tirole (2001)) that are not internalized by shareholders (Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet (2015)). This 
multi-dimensional and externality-driven nature of CSR suggests that it should be fundamentally related to not 
only a firm’s own choice but also regulations, institutional arrangements, and societal preferences. Moreover, 
beyond looking at CSR as a mechanism to address externalities, we consider CSR as a more fundamental 
tradeoff between a shareholder focus and an other-stakeholder focus (at the firm level) (Ferrell, Liang, and 
Renneboog (2017)), as well as between rules and discretion by institutions governing economic life. Such 
tradeoffs, as we argue, hinge crucially on a firm’s explicit and implicit contractual environment, which is 
likely to be shaped by legal rules and enforcement mechanisms that differ across countries.  
In this paper, we examine whether differences in CSR practices across countries can be explained by 
relating CSR to a country’s legal origin, which has been shown to systematically shape various country-level 
institutions and the firm-level contracting environment (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007)). In the context of CSR, a country’s legal regime determines how “public 
goods” should be provided by the private sector (corporations): through regulations and rules, firm discretion, 
or government involvement in business (Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012)). A country’s legal regime also 
shapes the explicit and (more often) implicit contracts between shareholders and other stakeholders through its 
effect on governance structures and the decision-making process.
2
 A common law origin is a more 
discretion-oriented system that supports private market outcomes, places fewer ex ante restrictions on 
managerial behavior (but discourages inappropriate or unacceptable behavior by relying on ex post sanctions 
such as litigation or other judicial mechanisms), and favors shareholder protection. A civil law origin, in 
contrast, is associated with state intervention in economic life through rules and regulations (e.g. an ex ante 
delineation of acceptable behavior) and a “stakeholder view” (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), 
Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2015), Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet (2015)). The level of CSR in a country is 
therefore a result of both a governance tradeoff concerning the rights and preferences of shareholders and 
other stakeholders, and the form in which this tradeoff is made (i.e., by rules or discretion).  
To empirically test the legal origin view of CSR, we employ several newly assembled international 
databases on firm-level CSR that together cover more than 25,000 large public companies around the globe. 
Our CSR data measure corporations’ engagement in and compliance with environmental, social, and 
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traditional corporate governance (“ESG”) issues, where engagement refers to a firm’s voluntary investment in 
CSR projects while compliance refers to behavior that a firm is required or encouraged to follow.
3
 
Engagement and compliance activities across the different ESG dimensions capture various aspects of 
stakeholder issues.
4
 As our main focus is on nonfinancial stakeholders (stakeholders other than shareholders, 
which are protected by corporate governance mechanisms), our CSR samples mostly rely on the “E” and “S” 
dimensions, giving little weight to the “G” dimension. 
Using these comprehensive global CSR data, we find that legal origin appears to be the strongest 
predictor of CSR adoption and performance at the firm level, stronger than alternative factors such as political 
institutions, regulations, social preferences, and a firm’s financial and operational performance. Firms with a 
common law origin score significantly lower on various CSR ratings than civil law firms, while firms from 
the Scandinavian legal regime obtain the highest scores on most of the CSR ratings. These results survive the 
inclusion of a large set of country- and firm-level control variables and the use of different estimation methods 
such as OLS, GLS, and random-effects ordered probit models. The results are further supported by several 
quasi-natural experiments of global disasters and scandals that shift societal demand for CSR that allows us to 
control for country fixed effects to rule out alternative explanations based on country-level channels. In these 
experiments, we find that firms in civil law countries are more responsive to large natural disasters and 
industry scandals such as food safety and oil spill pollution. Such responsiveness does not appear to be 
explained by changes in firms’ market shares. When we investigate a number of economic mechanisms for the 
association between legal origin and CSR, we find that firms in civil law countries face less shareholder 
litigation risk but more regulations concerning stakeholder welfare, rely more on supermajority rules among 
shareholders, and have stronger state involvement in their businesses, all of which are strongly related to 
higher CSR scores. Overall, the results suggest that there is a strong link between firm-level CSR and 
country-level legal origin, which may help explain cross-country variation in CSR.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I lays out the theoretical foundations on the relation between 
legal origin and CSR. Section II describes the data and empirical strategies. Section III presents empirical 
results from our baseline models. Section IV presents additional evidence from disasters and scandals. In 




I. The Legal Origins and Corporate Social Responsibility 
Social arrangements between private citizens, corporations, and the government vary significantly across 
countries of different legal origin. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) consider a country’s legal 
origin as the style of social control behind its economic life. Common law countries rely more heavily on 
private market outcomes. The idea is that under perfect markets, maximizing profit in the interest of 
shareholders leads a firm to act in the best interest of all stakeholders such as consumers, workers, and 
shareholders (Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet (2015)). In contrast, in civil law countries, the state plays a stronger 
coordinating role in factor markets. These countries typically have stronger unions, which has led to, for 
example, stricter regulations regarding dismissal or a wider scope of collective bargaining agreements (at the 
industry level), as well as stricter consumer protection laws, which place more restrictions on prices and 
regulate product markets to address various stakeholders’ interests (Djankov et al. (2008), Botero et al. (2004), 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)). 
In addition, countries under different legal regimes manage conflicts between firms, their suppliers, and 
their customers differently. Countries with a common law origin rely to a greater degree on ex post settling up 
through judicial mechanisms, whereas civil law countries rely more heavily on rules-based mechanisms that 
restrict behavior ex ante (Enriques (2004), Cheffins and Black (2006), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008), Issacharoff and Miller (2009), Cox and Thomas (2009), Gelter (2012)). The different balance 
between rules and discretion in corporate decision-making in civil versus common law countries is likely 
driven by supply- and demand-side considerations, which lead to predictions about differences in CSR activity 
across legal regimes. On the supply side, CSR may arise as an alternative response to market failures due to 
inefficient regulations (e.g., de Bettignies and Robinson (2015)). The fact that a wide variety of stakeholders 
can more easily make claims, and benefit from stronger protection, in civil law than in common law countries 
implies that there may be less need for firms in civil law countries to behave in a socially responsible way 
over and above meeting regulatory requirements, in which case CSR strategies would be largely redundant in 
light of the constraints and requirements already in place under the civil law regime. On the demand side, the 
level of CSR in a country may reflect consumers’ and other citizens’ preferences for corporations to be 
altruistic and pro-social (Benabou and Tirole (2006, 2010)). Based on this demand-side view, the fact that civil 
law countries have stricter regulatory protection of stakeholders may reflect stronger social preferences, in 
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which case we would expect stronger CSR behavior in civil law countries because more is expected of firms 
in this environment. In sum, CSR is likely to be an equilibrium outcome reflecting the demand for voluntary 
“good behavior” and the availability, as well as efficacy, of substitutes for this behavior. In this context, the 
relation between CSR and legal origin depends on which set of forces (supply- versus demand-side 
considerations) dominates. 
The above tradeoff leads to empirical predictions on the underlying mechanisms that connect legal origin 
and CSR. In common law countries, CSR adoption is determined largely by corporate discretion, whereas in 
civil law countries, CSR adoption is determined by rules, which can be either explicit (such as laws and 
regulations) or implicit (such as societal preferences). For example, in civil law countries where the risk of 
shareholder litigation against management or directors is lower, firms have more freedom to engage in CSR 
activities (which are often beyond regulation) (Enriques (2004), Cheffins and Black (2006), La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), Issacharoff and Miller (2009), Cox and Thomas (2009), Gelter (2012)). 
Similarly, when a firm’s decision-making process is ex ante insulated from the short-term pressures of 
shareholders (for example, through the presence of a supermajority vote requirement in the corporate charter 
or bylaws), the firm will be more willing to engage in CSR activities, which are often more 
long-term-orientated in nature (Cremers and Sepe (2016)). Furthermore, CSR is expected to be more prevalent 
under stronger regulations and government interventions on stakeholder issues, as CSR could potentially 
“safeguard” a firm’s fiduciary duty as mandated by law, with this function under different legal regimes again 
depending on the relative supply- versus demand-side forces.  
 
II. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Detailed definitions and data sources for all of our variables are summarized in Table I (for various CSR 
variables and sustainable country ratings) and Appendix A (for explanatory variables). 
A. CSR Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In recent years, a variety of ESG indices measuring firm-level CSR performance have been constructed 
using different rating methodologies (e.g., some are based on a box-ticking approach—“compliance,” while 
others are based on interpretative analysis—“engagement”). We have extensively discussed the reliability of 
these different ratings with practitioners, policymakers, and data providers. Because of the concern that the “G” 
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component of ESG measures overlaps with traditional corporate governance issues, which are materially 
different from the other stakeholder issues (Krueger (2015)), in this paper we deliberately employ databases 
that minimize the weight on corporate governance issues while putting more emphasis on environmental and 
social issues. 
Our main data on CSR performance come from MSCI’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) database.5 
The IVA indices measure a corporation’s environmental and social risks and opportunities, that is, large 
environmental and social externalities, the costs of which the firm may be forced to internalize in the future. 
The ratings also take into account the extent to which a company has developed CSR strategies designed to 
manage its specific risks and opportunities. Such rating methods capture both the legally mandated aspects 
(unanticipated costs associated with regulatory penalties and lawsuits) and voluntary aspects (risk 
management strategies and strategies to capture potential opportunities) of CSR. Importantly, companies are 
rated in comparison to their industry peers across international markets, and therefore a firm’s rating does not 
depend on the local environment and rules. Companies with the best CSR “performance” (CSR score) within 
its industry on a global scale are rated AAA (the top rating), while companies with the worst CSR 
performance are rated CCC (the lowest rating); the remaining firms are rated AA, A, BBB, BB, and B. We 
convert these alpha ratings to numeric scores from 6 to 0. Information needed to complete the IVA ratings 
comes from several sources, including corporate documents (environmental and social reports, annual reports, 
securities filings such as 10Ks and 10Qs, websites, etc.), environmental groups and other NGOs, trade groups 
and other industry associations, government databases,
6
 periodical searches (e.g., Factiva and Nexis), and 
financial analysts’ reports. Following a review of various corporate documents, the MSCI analysts usually 
interview senior executives at the companies, most often in the environmental area. When comparing 
companies, the data are normalized by the most relevant, available factor, such as domestic sales or 
production. The ratings are available from 1999 to 2014,7 and cover over 23,000 large public companies (past 
and current) in major equity indices worldwide, including all companies of the MSCI World Index, the MSCI 
Emerging Markets Index, the MSCI US, Canada, UK, Australia, and South Africa indexes, the FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 (excluding investment trusts) indexes, the ASX 200 Index, and the Barclays Global Aggregate – 
Corporate Index. For this large sample with global coverage, MSCI constructs 29 ESG categories,
8
 among 
which a few categories such as Labor Relations, Industry-Specific Carbon Risk, and Environmental 
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Opportunity receive the highest weights in the global rating, while the weight on traditional corporate 
governance is below 2%. The detailed composition of the IVA ratings is shown in Table I. We triangulate our 
analysis based on the IVA rating (the overall CSR rating) using the RiskMetrics EcoValue21 Rating and the 
RiskMetrics Social Rating (hereafter EcoValue Rating and Social Rating), which capture the environmental 
and social aspects of CSR, respectively. 
Our main sample comprises 403,633 firm-time observations from 114 countries that span 123 industries 
(based on MSCI’s industry classification). We employ other CSR indices provided by various ESG rating 
agencies with a global scope to cross-validate our results. These indices include Vigeo’s corporate ESG ratings 
and Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4 ratings. The country coverage and number of observations are shown in 
Appendices B to D. In contrast to the MSCI IVA data which focus on engagement (developing strategies to 
manage risks and opportunities), the Vigeo ESG data are more CSR compliance-oriented as they apply a 
check-the-box approach to rate firm- and country-level compliance with the conventions, guidelines, and 
declarations of international organizations such as the United Nations, International Labor Organization, and 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
[Insert Table I about here] 
B. Methodology 
As the IVA ratings measuring a company’s ESG performance are integers ranging from 0 to 6 and are not 
normally distributed, we first use the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test in a univariate 
analysis that compares median ESG values across different legal origins and between capitalist and socialist 
countries. We then apply reduced-form regressions to analyze the association between a company’s CSR and 
its country’s legal origin, political institutions, social preferences, and corporate characteristics (including 
financial performance). Given that some of our key explanatory variables (e.g., legal origin) are time-invariant 
and we would like to draw inferences on the population, we use random-effects models in this panel setting. 
We conduct our estimations using OLS, random-effects generalized least squares (GLS), and random-effects 
ordered probit models. The latter are estimated by means of maximum likelihood and consider the discrete, 
ordinal nature of the ratings and rating changes in a panel data setting (the same method has been used in, for 




∗ = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑐 + 𝛿
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑍c𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,                         (1) 
where, Legal is a vector of different types of civil law origin, 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a vector of firm-level financial and 
governance variables, and 𝑍c𝑡 is a vector of country-level control variables. Except for legal origin, all of the 
variables are time-variant in nature. i, t, and c denote firm, time, and country, respectively. The dependent 
variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , is the firm-level CSR rating. In the case of ordered probit models, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is an unobserved latent 










0            𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇1
1 𝑖𝑓 𝜇1 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇2
2 𝑖𝑓 𝜇2 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇3
3 𝑖𝑓 𝜇3 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇4
4 𝑖𝑓 𝜇4 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇5
5 𝑖𝑓 𝜇5 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 𝜇6









 ,                                (2) 
The 𝜇′𝑠  represent thresholds to be estimated (along with the coefficients 𝛽  and 𝛾 ) using maximum 
likelihood estimation, subject to the constraint that 𝜇1 < 𝜇2 < 𝜇3 < 𝜇4 < 𝜇5 < 𝜇6. 
We also run a few quasi-natural experiments on some (largely) exogenous shocks to CSR demand and 
examine the differences in response by legal regime using OLS estimation while controlling for country, 
industry, and year fixed effects. Controlling for country fixed effects in the quasi-natural experiments enables 
us to rule out alternative explanations based on other country-level factors such as ideologies, cultures, and 
social norms. In these quasi-natural experimental settings, we also investigate changes in market share to 
disentangle them from possible consequences induced by legal origin. Furthermore, we explicitly include 
several institutional and governance variables to explore potential mechanisms linking a firm’s CSR and its 
country’s legal origin in a two-stage setup. 
 
C. Variables 
In our main analysis, the dependent variable in equation (1) is the overall IVA rating, which aggregates 
all environmental and social dimensions of CSR after converting them to ordered integer scores ranging from 
0 to 6. In robustness tests, we use individual dimensions of the IVA rating as alternative dependent variables, 
as well as the CSR ratings from two alternative CSR samples—Vigeo and ASSET4—which are normalized 




Our main explanatory variable is legal origin, which captures the legal tradition of the country in which 
the firm is headquartered. Following La Porta et al. (LLSV, 1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2008), Djankov et al. (2008), and Spamann (2010), we classify legal traditions into five categories, as 
denoted by the following dummy variables: English common law, French civil law, German civil law, 
Scandinavian civil law, and socialist law (both current and former socialist countries). In robustness tests, we 
reclassify current and former socialist law countries into their pre-socialist legal origin (either French civil law 
or German civil law). 
Political Institutions 
We use several country-level variables to capture the effects of political institutions, which may both 
shape and reflect social preferences for CSR. First, we include Political Executive Constraints, developed by 
Polity IV, to proxy for the constraints on expropriation by the political elites. As Glaeser et al. (2004) explain, 
“[Political executive constraints] is the only measure that is clearly not a consequence of dictatorial choices, 
and […] can at least loosely be thought of as relating to constraints to government” (p. 282).  
Second, we include Corruption Control, which measures the extent to which politicians are constrained 
from pursuing their self-interest (through corruption). While other political variables capture democracy and 
aggregate social (stakeholder) preferences, but focus on limits to corruption because they are most closely 
connected to North’s (1981) conception of institutions as “constraints.” 
Third, we include a country’s Regulatory Quality from the World Bank to proxy for the government’s 
effectiveness in addressing social responsibility and market externalities in implementing policies and 
regulations that promote private sector development. CSR investment may be supported or limited by a 
country’s regulatory environment. 
In robustness tests, we also control for a country’s capitalist model using the Heritage Index of Economic 
Freedom, which consists of a broad series of sub-indexes measuring different aspects of government 
interference in business activities, such as government spending, fiscal freedom, business freedom, labor 
freedom, and monetary freedom. Not surprisingly, these sub-indexes are highly correlated with one another, 
and thus we only include the overall score as a control, rather than the individual sub-indices. In unreported 
regressions, we also include the sub-indexes in the regression one at a time; the results for our key explanatory 
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variables do not change.  
Blockholder Ownership 
Including different types of blockholder ownership in our model is important as different ownership types 
reflect different investor preferences. In particular, different types of blockholders may favor different CSR 
policies and can use their voting power to implement those policies. Blockholders are defined as investors 
who hold more than 5% of the company’s total shares. We classify their ownership stakes into Government 
Held Shares, Corporation Held Shares, Pension Fund Held Shares, Investment Company Held Shares, 
Employee Held Shares, Other Holdings, and Foreign Held Shares. The sum of all blockholder ownership 
stakes equals a company’s Total Strategic Holdings. The remaining holdings comprise Free Float Shares. 
Firm-Level Financial Variables 
A standard control variable is firm size, measured by the (logarithm of) total assets of the company. To 
capture the “doing good by doing well” effect, we also control for firm performance as proxied by the return 
on assets (ROA). In robustness tests we add the market valuation of the firm, which we capture using Tobin’s 
Q (the market-to-book ratio). 
Other Country-Level Controls 
In equation (1), we further control for a country’s level of economic development using the (logarithm of) 
GDP per capita and a globalization index. GDP per capita captures income and wealth effects, as people in 
richer countries are more likely to care about sustainability, whereas those in poor countries are more worried 
about daily economic survival. The globalization index captures the spillover of CSR standards across 
countries, as corporations in more globalized countries are under greater pressure to comply with international 
conventions and principles that prescribe acceptable corporate social conduct.  
From Vigeo, we also obtain country-level sustainability ratings that comprise the ESG scores of more 
than 170  sovereign countries. These ratings are based on the analysis of more than 130 CSR risk and 
performance indicators in three  domains: (1) environmental protection, (2) social protection and solidarity, 
and (3) rule of law and governance. By supplementing our firm-level CSR ratings, these country-level ESG 






A. Descriptive Results 
We first plot in Figure 1, Panel A the distribution of country-level sustainability ratings on a world map 
using the adjusted Vigeo sustainability ratings. Ratings are rescaled to eight categories representing the degree 
of a country’s sustainable development in terms of environmental responsibility, social responsibility, and 
institutional responsibility (rule of law and governance), with darker shading indicating a higher rating. In 
Figure 1, Panel B we plot the distribution of legal origins around the world. As can be seen comparing the two 
panels, countries with a higher social responsibility (sustainability) rating are more likely to be civil law 
countries than common law countries, with Scandinavian countries having the highest scores.  
[Insert Figures 1, Panels A & B about here] 
 
We turn the above color maps into numbers in Table II, but here we use firm-level CSR data and compare 
the mean CSR ratings for countries belonging to different legal origins. In addition to the overall CSR rating 
(IVA Rating) and two general ratings on environmental and social policies (EcoValue Rating and Social 
Rating), we also report results for the various components of the CSR subcategories, which represent benefits 
for different types of stakeholders.
9
 Again, darker shading indicates a higher CSR rating, and the variance of 
the ratings are shown in parentheses. Comparisons of the means of the CSR indices across legal origins show 
that firms under the English common law system have lower CSR scores along most ESG dimensions than 
those under civil law systems. Firms from the Scandinavian and German legal origins have higher CSR scores 
than those from the English common law system, especially in terms of environmental issues, as indicated by 
EcoValue Rating and the subcategories Environment, Environmental Management Capacity, Environmental 
Opportunity, Industry-Specific Carbon Risk, Environmental Strategy, Environmental Management Systems, 
Environmental Accounting Reporting, Certification (e.g., ISO14000), etc. Among social- and labor-related 
issues, firms with a French legal origin assume more CSR than those with an English or German legal origin, 
as can be seen from the scores on Social Rating and the subcategories Human Capital, Stakeholder Capital, 
Employee Motivation and Development, Labor Relations, Health Safety, Customer Stakeholder Partnerships, 
Human Rights Child and Forced Labor, etc. The English common law system has higher scores than civil law 
systems in the domain of the firm’s interactions with local communities and traditional corporate governance 
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concerns. Companies with a socialist legal origin have the lowest levels of CSR across the board. 
We further compare differences across legal origins for various aspects of CSR using a nonparametric 
test (Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test). Table III shows that the differences in ESG performance 
(overall and by component) are highly statistically significant across legal families, and that civil law 
countries consistently score higher than common law countries along all ESG subfields. Among the civil law 
countries, we find that firms in countries with a German legal origin have higher CSR scores than their 
counterparts with a French legal origin in terms of environmental policy (EcoValue Rating, Industry-Specific 
Carbon Risk, and Environmental Opportunity), but the French legal origin firms have higher CSR scores in 
terms of social issues and labor relations than German legal origin companies. Finally, firms from capitalist 
economies attach more attention to ESG issues than those from current and former socialist countries (Russia, 
China, and some Eastern European countries). Overall, the descriptive results suggest that there are systematic 
differences in various ESG ratings across different legal origins. 
[Insert Tables II and III about here] 
 
B. Main Results 
We now turn to regression analysis to formally test the relation between CSR and legal origin as well as 
other country- and firm-level characteristics. In Table IV, we present results using different estimation 
methods. Column (1) reports OLS results using the baseline set of control variables. Column (2) uses the same 
variables as in column (1) but the model is estimated by GLS. Columns (3) to (5) extend the GLS model by 
including additional control variables. Columns (6) and (7) report results obtained using random-effects 
ordered probit models (with some control variables missing due to convergence in maximum likelihood 
estimations). The dependent variable in all regressions is the overall IVA rating at the firm level, which is a 
proxy for a company’s engagement in and compliance with various environmental and social issues. 
Following LLSV (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann 
(2010), we take the English common law origin as our benchmark and therefore omit it from the models, and 
we exclude former and current socialist countries, which, as Aghion et al. (2010) argue, are in transition and 
not in equilibrium.
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 Only in a robustness test do we include the socialist countries and recategorize them 
according to their pre-socialist legal origin (either German civil law or French civil law) (see, for example, 
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column (7)). We include industry and year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the country level in all 
estimations. 
Several important observations can be made. First, the coefficients on the French, German, and 
Scandinavian civil law origins are positive and statistically significant across all specifications, regardless of 
the estimation method used. The results further imply that on average firms under a civil law system have a 
higher CSR score than those under the English common law system. The economic effects are substantial: on 
average firms in civil law countries have a 7% higher CSR score (or a half-grade on a 0 to 6 scale) than firms 
in common law countries (columns (1) and (2)). The difference is even larger—at more than 14%, or 0.85 to 1 
of a grade—when we add more control variables such as a firm’s investment opportunities (market-to-book 
ratio), the firm’s degree of shareholder orientation (Anti-Director Rights Index), and the economic freedom 
index capturing the degree to which the country follows a capitalist model (column (5)). Taken together, the 
results support that civil law firms score significantly higher than common law firms on the overall IVA index. 
The legal origin theory in the law and finance literature argues that common law (French civil law) countries 
generally have the strongest (weakest) investor protection, financial development, and economic efficiency 
(LLSV (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)). Our findings echo this theory and are 
consistent with the prediction under the demand-side story that higher CSR reflects stronger social preferences 
for stakeholder claims in civil law countries. 
The second main observation from Table IV is that political institutions—Corruption Control, Political 
Executive Constraints, Regulatory Quality, and Economic Freedom (the type of capitalist model)—are not 
strongly associated with firm-level CSR. GDP per capita is not a predictor of CSR, whereas a country’s degree 
of globalization (whose correlation with the legal origins dummies is low (below 20%)) is a strong predictor 
of firm-level CSR: companies in more open and globalized economies have higher CSR scores.
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Looking at the firm-level variables, Table IV shows that firm size is strongly related to CSR performance: 
on average larger firms invest more in CSR. The coefficients on ROA are positive and significant in most 
specifications, in line with the “doing good by doing well” hypothesis. Market valuation (Tobin’s Q) is not 
strongly related with CSR, except in specification (7). We also find that on average a firm that has stronger 
investor protection (a high Anti-Director Rights Index) invests more in CSR. 




C. Robustness Tests 
C.1 Alternative Theories 
As LLSV (1998, 1999) state that legal origin may shape the ownership structure of a company, we 
examine whether the relation between CSR and legal origin captures the effect of a firm’s ownership structure. 
To do so, we add to the benchmark GLS model (model (2) of Table IV) total ownership concentration and the 
ownership share held by different types of shareholders. The results are reported in Panel A of Table V. We 
find that both the statistical and economic effects of legal origin hold after including the various ownership 
variables. Furthermore, the coefficients on the ownership variables themselves are mostly insignificant. 
Therefore, the percentage stakes in the hands of different blockholders are not likely to be proxies for legal 
origin. 
One criticism of the legal origin theory is that legal origin dummies are proxies for national culture and 
values, which have been shown to be strongly related to economic outcomes (Stulz and Williamson (2003), 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006), Tabellini (2010)). To address this concern, we follow La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and control for religion as well as the Hofstede cultural dimensions, 
which are widely used cultural indices that capture social attitudes and norms (Hofstede and Hofstede (2005)). 
The six cultural indices comprise Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Pragmatism, and Indulgence (for definitions see Appendix A). In addition, in line with the Weber thesis that 
differences between Protestantism and Catholicism in terms of work and social ethics have affected capitalist 
development and corporate growth (see Iannacone (1998) for an overview of the economics of religion), we 
include the binary variable Protestant, which captures whether a country has a Protestant majority. The results 
are reported in Panel B of Table V. Again, the cultural and religion variables do not make much of a dent in 
the explanatory power of legal origin, and the explanatory power of the cultural variables themselves is 
statistically insignificant, weak, or not persistent. We therefore conclude that the cultural explanation does not 
hold. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
 
C.2 Alternative Dependent Variables 
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As mentioned above, we obtained the IVA data in two waves: the first wave spans the period 1999 to 
2011, and the second wave spans 2011 to 2014. The overall IVA rating that we use in the above tests combines 
the IVA ratings from the two waves, but we also have ratings for different dimensions of CSR for the first 
wave. Thus, in additional robustness checks, we repeat the baseline tests but replace the dependent variable in 
Tables IV and V—the overall IVA rating—with (i) the general IVA scores for each of the two waves (models 
(1) and (4) of Table VI) to shed light on whether possible changes in CSR measurement methodology affect 
the results, (ii) environmental scores capturing a CSR focus on various ecological targets and efficiency 
(Environmental Score for the 2011 to 2014 wave in model (2), RiskMetrics EcoValue Rating for the 1999 to 
2011 wave in model (5), Opportunity in Cleantech in model (8), Environmental Opportunity Factors in model 
(11), Sustainability Risk in Model (12), Industry-Specific Carbon Risk in model (13), Environmental Strategy 
in model (14), Environmental Management Systems in model (15), Environmental Accounting Reporting in 
model (16), Environmental Training & Development in model (17), Environmental Strategic Competence in 
model (19), and Environmental Performance in model (20)), and (iii) social scores capturing a CSR focus on 
employees, customers, suppliers, and the community at large (Social score for the 2011 to 2014 wave in 
model (3), RiskMetrics Social Rating for the 1999 to 2011 wave in model (6), Labor Relations in model (9), 
and Product Development, Safety, and Materials in models (7) , (10), and (18)). The results in Table VI reveal 
that the wave-specific IVA scores and the various environmental and social indices are strongly and 
consistently correlated to legal origin. Moreover, we confirm that, relative to firms with English legal origin, 
firms from civil law countries have higher CSR scores. In 18 of the 20 models (the exceptions being Models 
(2) and (9)), firms with a Scandinavian legal origin have the highest CSR scores. 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
 
C.3 Alternative CSR Samples 
Another concern with our main analysis could be that our finding that civil law firms have higher CSR 
ratings than their common law counterparts is driven by our CSR data. Although we have shown that the 
results hold across specifications with different dependent variables, such similarity could be due to the fact 
that the different dependent variables are based on similar rating methodologies (developed by MSCI). To 
address this concern, we repeat our main tests using two alternative CSR samples with global coverage: (i) 
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Vigeo’s corporate ESG (panel) data, which cover the environment, human rights, human resources, business 
behavior (customers and suppliers), community involvement, and corporate governance, and (ii) Thomson 
Reuters’ ASSET4 (panel) data, which comprise a company’s engagement in and compliance with 
environmental and social aspects.
12
 Table VII shows that that our previous results largely survive: firms with 
a civil law origin continue to have higher CSR scores than those with a common law origin. The only 
exception is in model (6), where Corporate Governance is the dependent variable: the three civil law 
dummies have a negative sign, indicating that firms with an English legal origin have higher corporate 
governance scores than firms with a French or German legal origin. This finding is not unexpected in light of 
extant empirical evidence, as this Vigeo sub-index measures traditional governance concerns that focus on 
shareholder protection (rather than stakeholder protection). The fact that firms with a common law origin have 
a stronger shareholder orientation (i.e., stronger corporate governance) is indeed consistent with the traditional 
law and finance view. In sum, the results across our various robustness tests support the demand-side 
prediction that firms in civil law countries invest more in CSR.  
[Insert Table VII about here] 
 
IV. Evidence from Scandals and Disasters 
The results so far show that there is a strong and consistent correlation between a firm’s level of CSR 
investment and its country’s legal origin, with civil law firms investing more in CSR than common law firms. 
This is an average effect. Based on the demand-side arguments, a potential reason why, on average, firms in 
civil law countries have higher levels of CSR investment than firms in common law countries may be that 
they are more responsive to the change in the demand for CSR. This argument describes a marginal effect. To 
examine the role of a “responsiveness” channel, we conduct several quasi-natural experiments of “shocks” to 
CSR demand. Doing so also allows us to control for country fixed effects (to take into account the influence 
of time-invariant country-level factors) while still examining the effects of legal origin by means of interaction 
terms. We estimate these tests using a differences-in-difference (DiD) approach. In general, a DiD estimation 
can be specified as 
𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐶𝑠 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼𝑙𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡,             (3) 
where 𝐴𝑐 , 𝐵𝑡 , and 𝐶𝑠  are country, year, and sector (industry) fixed effects, respectively, 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡  are the 
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relevant firm- and country-level controls, 𝐼𝑙𝑡 is the interaction between legal origin (civil law) and the year 
dummy such that the estimated impact of legal origin (civil law in year t) is captured by the OLS estimate 𝛾, 
and 𝜖𝑖𝑐𝑡 is an error term. Standard errors are clustered across firms and over time to account for serial and 
cross-sectional correlations. 
We conduct three quasi-experiments related to unexpected corporate scandals or natural disasters, which, 
as we argue, move firms in the relevant industries “out of equilibrium” and magnify the costs and benefits of 
different legal regimes. We deliberately choose shocks that had a huge global impact so that we can make 
comparisons across legal regimes. These shocks include the Chinese milk scandal in November 2008, the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in March/April 2010, and the Asian earthquake and tsunami in December 2004. 
We distinguish two responsiveness channels of CSR. One is a consumer channel, whereby the unexpected 
shocks trigger shifts in consumer demand and changes in firms’ market share that force companies to adjust 
their CSR. The other is a legal channel, whereby firms in a more CSR-friendly legal environment (stronger 
stakeholder orientation in the spirit of the law) tend to be more responsive to shocks and supply more social 
goods. In our analyses below, we try to disentangle these two channels. We use the ASSET4 sample for these 
analyses because it has detailed sub-CSR scores for items such as cash donations and spill and pollution 
controls, which directly correspond to each of the shocks considered. 
The Chinese Milk Scandal and Product Responsibility 
The 2008 Chinese milk scandal was a food safety incident in China involving milk and infant formulae as 
well as other food materials and components that had been adulterated with melamine. Twenty-two Chinese 
diary companies, including market leaders such as Mengniu, were reported to have contaminated products. By 
November 2008, China reported an estimated 300,000 victims, with six infants dying from kidney stones and 
other kidney damage, and an estimated 54,000 babies hospitalized. The World Health Organization referred to 
the incident as one of the largest food safety events it had faced in recent years. The incident raised severe 
concerns about food safety, not only in China but all over the world, as many food manufacturing and 
processing companies import food materials and components from China or have foreign operations in China. 
The European Union, European Commission, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration all tightened food 
safety checks and regulations in the wake of this incident.  
The Chinese milk scandal also raised food-related companies’ awareness about their responsibility to 
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ensure their product safety. We therefore use the “product responsibility” rating of ASSET4 to compare 
companies’ reactions—across legal regimes—in terms of improving their own product safety as measured by 
their product responsibility scores. We exclude Chinese firms from the sample to avoid the (expectedly strong) 
local impact on our international results. Column (1) of Table VIII presents the results. The DiD estimator is 
the coefficient on “Civil Law × Post-2009.” The coefficient is positive and statistically significant with a 
nontrivial economic magnitude, indicating that on average food-related companies in civil law countries 
improved their product responsibility performance by more than 5% (a coefficient of 5.344 on a scale of 100) 
in relation to firms in common law countries. As a robustness check, we run the same regression on the 
product safety rating from the IVA sample. As can be seen in column (2) of Table VIII, the coefficient on 
“Civil Law × Post-2009” is still positive and significant. Given that the IVA rating is on a scale of 0 to 10, the 
economic magnitudes are similar across the two regressions (5% to 7%). Taken together, the results point to a 
higher responsiveness of firms in civil law countries following this food product safety scandal. 
 
The Indian Ocean Earthquake and Corporate Donations 
The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded 
history. On December 26, 2004, an undersea megathrust earthquake triggered a series of devastating tsunamis 
along the coasts of most landmasses bordering the Indian Ocean, killing over 230,000 people in 14 countries 
and inundating many coastal communities. The plight of the people affected prompted a worldwide 
humanitarian response. In all, the worldwide community donated more than $14 billion in humanitarian aid; 
while some funds came from national governments, most were corporate cash donations. 
While corporations regularly donate money in normal times, the earthquake and tsunami led to a surge in 
corporate donations as part of the relief effort. Godfrey (2005) and Patten (2008) argue that philanthropic 
giving (as a response to disasters) is perceived as a genuine manifestation of a firm’s underlying social 
responsiveness. We therefore compare cash donations (including both direct cash giving and cash giving via a 
corporate foundation) made in 2005, right after the disaster, by corporations in our sample. We calculate 
corporate cash donations following the standard approach as in Masulis and Reza (2015), and focus on cash 




Column (3) of Table VIII 
reports the results from this experiment with the same control variables as before. Here, the coefficient on 
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“Civil Law × Year 2005” is the DiD estimator. The reason for interacting the civil law dummy with a year 
dummy rather than with a post-disaster dummy (e.g., Post-2005) is that, unlike the food scandal, which likely 
shifted CSR demand and had lasting effects on corporate CSR policies, donations are disaster-specific and are 
made only in the year of or following a disaster, rather than in all subsequent years. (Below, in a placebo test, 
we examine the role of donation timing). Again, the interaction coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that firms in civil law countries donated on average more money than those in common 
law countries right after the Asian earthquake disaster. This finding suggests that a firm’s underlying social 
responsiveness (as manifested by philanthropic giving after natural disasters) is stronger in civil law countries 
than in common law countries. 
 
The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Corporate Environmental Concerns 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill, also known as the BP oil disaster, began on April 20, 2010 in the Gulf 
of Mexico on the BP-operated Macondo Prospect, as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploding and 
sinking. This incident is considered the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum 
industry. The spill had a severe environmental impact. The U.S. government estimated the total discharge at 
4.9 million barrels (210 million U.S. gallons, or 780,000 cubic meters), which directly polluted 68,000 square 
miles (180,000 square kilometers) of ocean and had a devastating effect on marine life in the Gulf.  
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was an environmental shock to all energy-related industries in terms of 
the environmental consequences of their production and operations. We therefore compare, across legal 
regimes, corporations’ environmental CSR activities after the oil spill. Using the detailed CSR indices of 
ASSET4, we measure a company’s environmental CSR investment with three variables most closely related to 
oil spills and pollution controls under the ASSET4 environment classification, all of which are on a scale of 
100: (a) “Spill and Pollution Control,” which captures a company’s direct risk management policies related to 
oil spills and pollution, (b) “Environmental R&D Spending,” which captures a company’s efforts in 
developing new technologies that are more environmentally friendly, and (c) “Clean Energy Products,” which 
captures whether a company substitutes its energy-intensive products with products using new technologies 
and clean energies. Columns (4) to (6) of Table VIII report the results using similar tests as in columns (1) and 
(2), except that the DiD estimator is now the coefficient on “Civil Law × Post-2010.” The coefficients on the 
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three environmental performance variables are all positive and statistically significant, indicating that on 
average energy-related firms in civil law countries upgraded various aspects of their environmental 
performance—by strengthening their spill and pollution controls, investing more in environmental R&D, and 
developing more clean-energy products—by 7% (7-grade increase on a 100-point scale) relative to 
energy-related firms in common law countries. In a robustness check we interact the civil law dummy with the 
year 2010 dummy (columns (7) to (10)), and find similar results, both statistically and economically. Taken 
together, these results suggest that companies from different legal regimes respond differently to the oil spill 
shock, with such differences in responses both immediate and persistent over time.  
[Insert Table VIII about here] 
 
A. Placebo Tests 
We conduct several placebo tests on alternative industries and event years for the scandals and disasters 
analyzed above to rule out potential industry- and year-specific confounding effects. For the food scandal, we 
estimate identical models for several nonfood industries (including the oil and gas industry). Similarly, for the 
oil spill disaster, we estimate identical models for several non-oil-and-gas industries (including the food 
industry). The alternative industries other than the food and the oil and gas industries include software and IT 
services, professional and commercial services, and financials. For the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami 
disaster, which triggered corporate donations from firms across all industries, we rerun the model for 
alternative years during our sample period. The results for these placebo tests are reported in Table IX, with 
Panels A and B presenting results for product responsibility and environmental performance ratings in 
alternative industries after the food scandal and the oil spill disaster, respectively, and Panel C presenting 
results on corporate donations for alternative years. We find that the milk scandal had no impact on nonfood 
industries for firms in civil law countries, as the coefficients on interaction “Civil law × Post-2009” are not 
statistically significant. This finding supports the results presented in Table VIII and suggests that firms’ CSR 
reactions in the area of food safety are specific to the food industry. Likewise, we note that the oil spill 
disaster did not affect other industries in terms of corporate environmental actions after the disaster. The 
placebo tests on alternative years for the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami also support our previous 
results: the interactions between the civil law dummy and years not affected by a global disaster are not 
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statistically significant, in contrast to the interaction between the civil law dummy and the post-disaster year 
(Year 2005), which is positive and significant. This implies that the difference in cash donations between 
common law firms and civil law firms is likely to be driven by year-specific disaster events.  
[Insert Table IX about here] 
 
B. Changing Market Shares following Scandals 
As mentioned above, differences in CSR responsiveness across legal regimes may be driven by changes 
in firms’ market share, that is, consumers in some countries may react more to these shocks, with their 
demand for CSR shifting more, which would force companies to react more strongly in terms of improving 
their CSR performance (de Bettignies and Robinson (2015)). Differences in such consumer demand shifts 
may coincide with differences across legal regimes. An alternative explanation is that firms in more 
CSR-friendly legal regimes (i.e., civil law countries) respond more per unit of shock, which is a direct legal 
channel.  
To disentangle these two channels, we investigate whether the above shocks are associated with changes 
in firms’ market share, whether market share changes, if any, are further related to changes in CSR practices, 
and whether these relations differ across legal regimes. The Chinese milk scandal and the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill disaster provide distinct settings in terms of industry composition, and thus are ideal for investigating 
the impact of the consumer channel. In particular, the oil and gas industry is dominated by large international 
firms originating from different legal regimes (such as Total S.A. in France, BP in the U.K., ExxonMobil in 
the U.S., Royal Dutch Shell in the Netherlands, and Statoil in Norway), whereas the food industry comprises 
many smaller local firms. The food scandal may shift consumer demand away from the larger food companies 
(which are tracked by CSR data providers) towards small, local producers (which are largely untracked), 
whereas domestic consumer demand for oil and gas is relatively inelastic due to the oligopolistic nature of the 
local industry (though consumers may shift their demand across large international firms following an energy 
scandal). If our findings above regarding differences in CSR responsiveness across legal regimes are driven 
mainly by changes in market share (i.e., companies change their CSR practices in response to a decline in 
market share as consumers shift to other companies), we would expect variation in the effect of the shock on 




We test this consumer channel by using the change in a company’s market share of sales revenue in its 
industry following the shock as a proxy for consumer demand shifts. For the food scandal, we define an 
“industry” as the domestic industry of all companies in a certain year, while for the oil spill disaster, we define 
an “industry” as the global industry of companies within our sample13 in a certain year. Panel A of Table X 
reports results on changes in the domestic market shares of our sample companies, which are mostly large 
firms, in response to the Chinese milk scandal and the correlation between these market share changes and the 
product responsibility score (ASSET4) of companies in food-related industries after the scandal. We find that 
the domestic market share of our sample firms (mostly large firms with CSR ratings) declines following the 
scandal, likely towards smaller, local food producers (which do not have CSR ratings), and that this effect 
arises not in the year of the scandal but over the five-year period subsequent to the scandal. We next test 
whether the shifts in our sample firms’ market share following the food scandal are related to the product 
responsibility scores of food sector firms in civil and common law countries in the post-scandal period. We 
find that the changing market shares after the scandal are not significantly correlated with changes in CSR in 
either civil law or common law countries, which works against the argument that differences in CSR 
responsiveness between common law and civil law countries are driven by a decline in market shares. Panel B 
of Table X reports results on changes in international market shares in response to the oil spill and their 
correlation with oil and gas companies’ spill and pollution control scores after the shock. Subsequent to the oil 
spill shock, we observe a small though significant change in market share in firms operating in the traditional 
energy sector (which could result from a consumer demand shift away from the legacy energy firms towards 
firms active in alternative energy). A large shift in market share is unexpected given that alternative energy 
production, while growing, is still a small part of the market relative to traditional carbon-based energy 
production. Panel B also shows that the market share shift does not differ between firms with civil or common 
law origin: we do not find a significant correlation between changes in oil and gas companies’ market shares 
after the spill and changes in the spill and pollution control index. Taken together, these results support the 
legal channel for the differences in CSR responsiveness across legal regimes that we document. 




V. Economic Mechanisms 
The results above show that systematic differences in CSR across legal regimes are not likely to be driven 
by changing market shares. In addition, in our benchmark models in Table IV, we find that institutional 
variables such as Regulatory Quality, Political Executive Constraints, and Anti-Director Rights Index are not 
statistically significant and that their inclusion does not affect the significance of the legal origin dummies, 
which suggests that they are not likely to be the channels through which legal origin operates. In this section, 
we directly test additional possible mechanisms at both the country level and the firm level as outlined in 
Section I. These tests are based on the idea that CSR in civil law countries is more rule-driven whereas CSR in 
common law countries relies more on ex ante discretion and ex post settlement. 
We first use the shareholder litigation risk index developed by LLSV (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008) to 
test for the ex post settling up mechanism in common law countries (as opposed to the rule-based mechanism 
in civil law regimes). When the risk of shareholder litigation is low, firms are more willing to engage in CSR 
activities that often go beyond what is required by law, and common law countries tend to utilize ex post 
shareholder litigation mechanisms to a greater extent to empower shareholders to sue corporate directors 
(LLSV (1998), Issacharoff and Miller (2009), Cox and Thomas (2009), Gelter (2012)). Similarly, we 
investigate whether the level of CSR is higher when a firm’s decision-making process is ex ante insulated 
from the pressures of its (different types of) shareholders through the presence of a supermajority vote 
requirement in its corporate charter or bylaws, which is more prevalent under civil law systems (Hopt (1997), 
Cheffins and Black (2006)). 
Another mechanism of interest relates to regulations and the direct involvement of the government in 
business. As argued by La Porta et al. (1999) and Botero et al. (2004), legal origin proxies for the state’s 
tendency to intervene in economic life: civil law countries tend to rely more on regulation and state 
intervention, whereas common law countries tend to rely more on markets and contracts. To test for this 
mechanism, we use several country-level indices including an employment laws index, a collective bargaining 
laws index, and the prevalence of state involvement in the economy.  
We conduct our tests on these economic mechanisms in two stages: in the first stage we regress each of 
the channel variables on the civil law dummy, and in the second stage we regress the overall CSR rating on 
the channel variable “predicted” from the first stage, that is, on the variation in the channel variables that is 
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explained by legal origin. Control variables are included in both stages. This approach is akin to an IV 
approach except that the civil law dummy is not treated as the IV for the channel variable, was it is possible 
that civil law can operate on CSR through channels other than those that we consider here. 
Table XI presents the results. We find that, in the first stage, civil law origin is negatively correlated with 
shareholder litigation risk (model (1)), and positively correlated with the presence of supermajority rules 
(model (3)), labor and union laws (models (5) and (7)), and the degree of state involvement in the economy 
(model (9)). In the second stage, we find that shareholder litigation risk is negatively correlated with the level 
of CSR (model (2)), whereas the other channel variables are all positively correlated with CSR (models (4), 
(6), (8), and (10)). These results are consistent with the notion that civil law countries rely more heavily on 
rules-based mechanisms that restrict behavior ex ante and reflect a stronger focus on (or demand for) 
stakeholder orientation in these societies, which implies that rule-based mechanisms are related to higher 
levels of CSR. We again point out that this analysis is not conclusive as other channels could potentially 
explain the link between legal origin and CSR, and civil law may function through other mechanisms that are 
positively related to firms’ CSR. Nevertheless, the significance in both stages is indicative of greater reliance 
on ex ante constraints and less ex post settling up in civil law countries driving the link between civil law 
regimes and CSR. 
[Insert Table XI about here] 
 
VI. Conclusion 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008: 326) claim that “Legal origins—broadly interpreted as 
highly persistent systems of social control of economic life—have significant consequences for the legal and 
regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes.” Motivated by this insight, in this 
paper we examine whether legal origin helps explain cross-country variation in an increasingly important 
business activity, namely, CSR. We assess a firm’s CSR by using proxies for corporate stakeholder concerns, 
such as environmental and social policies, and by analyzing large-scale public and proprietary databases 
covering over 25,000 securities of large corporations around the world. We find strong support for the legal 
origin explanation of CSR scores, much more so than for alternative explanations, such as CSR’s relation with 
social preferences, regulatory quality, political institutions, and culture at the country level, and ownership 
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structure, corporate governance, and financial performance at the firm level. CSR scores are higher in civil 
law countries than in common law countries, and on average companies with a Scandinavian legal origin have 
the highest CSR scores. This is consistent with demand-side arguments that CSR reflects social preferences 
for good corporate behavior and a stakeholder orientation, and that such social preferences are more 
embedded in rule-based mechanisms that restrict firm behavior ex ante, mechanisms that are more prevalent 
in civil law countries. Such rule-based managerial constraints are less common in common law countries 
where ex post settling up mechanisms (i.e., judicial resolutions) are more important. In additional evidence we 
find that the positive link between civil law origin and CSR can be explained by, among other potential 
channels: lower shareholder litigation risk, the presence of supermajority rule in a firm, stronger labor 
regulations, and a high degree of state involvement in business. Evidence from exogenous scandals and 
disasters further suggests that companies in civil law countries are more responsive than those in common law 
countries in terms of improving their CSR practices when these shocks occur, and that this responsiveness is 
not likely to be driven by shifts in market share.  
The relevance of our findings is two-fold. At the macro level, our results shed light on the role of legal 
origin in driving financial and other economic outcomes, a question subject to debate since LLSV (1998) first 
introduces this thesis (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (2003), Roe (2006), Spamann (2010), La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)). Still, while the debate in the law and finance literature focuses mostly 
on the protection of investor rights as well as economic freedom and efficiency based on contracting and 
institutional arrangements as governed by legal rules (areas in which the common law origin appears to be 
“superior”), little is known about how similar mechanisms relate to the welfare of other stakeholders. We 
show that the common law system supports CSR to less extent than civil law regimes. This is consistent with 
LLSV’s premise: the common law tradition emphasizes shareholder primacy and a private market-oriented 
strategy of social control, and perhaps because of this emphasis, it is also less stakeholder-oriented. 
Stakeholder rights are usually protected by rules and a state-desired approach to social control. Of course, 
CSR may be a result of both rules and discretion, as we find that the level of CSR is highest under the 
Scandinavian legal regime, which lies somewhere between heavily rule-based and discretion-oriented 
systems. 
At the micro level, our findings contribute to our understanding of what drives CSR, which has recently 
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attracted much interest in finance. While existing studies focus mostly on the financial and strategic motives 
for CSR in specific countries and in specific economic settings, we extend the scope of CSR research to a 
global scale by using several large CSR samples with international coverage to analyze the determinants of 
CSR at the country level, a question that has received little attention to date. In addition, we show that our 
results hold for both CSR engagement and CSR compliance, which suggests that CSR does not merely focus 
on corporate strategic actions to boost financial performance (engagement), or compliance with the rules. 
Rather, both engagement and compliance are systematically related to differences in legal regimes across 
countries. This focus on the legal contexts underlying CSR also contributes to the broader theme of corporate 
governance, especially to the shareholder-stakeholder tradeoff in modern corporations.  
We caution that none of our arguments or findings are meant to suggest that the equilibrium level of 
“total” social responsibility is higher in civil countries. Rather, the results simply show that on average 
common law societies invest less in CSR. Indeed, some recent studies consider the extent to which CSR 
crowds out the provision of public goods provided by other actors (Graff Zivin and Small (2005), Baron 
(2007)). In this sense, the higher levels of CSR in civil law countries may reflect constraints to a larger degree 
than managerial objectives. Therefore, firms in different countries may have different value-maximizing levels 
of CSR, and it is possible that the legal regimes in some countries can constrain their firms from achieving 
such value-maximizing levels, either due to regulations or by shaping a firm’s attitude towards stakeholders 
via governance devices. Overall, the level of CSR in a country reflects the intersection of the supply of 
socially responsible behavior by firms and the demand for CSR practices by society, and our findings suggest 
that a country’s legal origin may be a primary force behind the equilibrium result. This result underscores 
profound role that the legal regime plays in economic life and suggests that CSR—an increasingly important 
business activity—is fundamentally related to the legal origin of a country. 
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Panel A. Adjusted country-level sustainability ratings around the world (Source: Vigeo Sustainable Country Ratings) 
 
 
Panel B. Legal origins around the world (Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)) 






Table I  
Description of the CSR Indices 
Panel A. Descriptions of CSR Ratings Used as Dependent Variables and the Sustainable Country Rating 
Overall IVA 
rating 
The IVA rating identifies key environmental, social, and governance issues that hold the greatest potential risk or 
opportunity for each industry sector. Themes on “environment” include climate change, natural resources, pollution and 
waste, and environmental opportunities. Themes on “social” include human capital, product liability, stakeholder 
opposition, and social opportunities. More detailed decompositions of key issues under each theme are listed below in 
Environmental score and Social score. IVA analyzes each company’s risk exposure, measuring the extent to which a 
company’s core business is at risk of incurring unanticipated losses. When comparing companies, the data are normalized 
by the most relevant, available factor, such as sales or production levels. The data are then converted to a relative rating 
by giving the company with the best performance in its industry sector in a given category a AAA rating, the top rating, 
while giving the company with the worst performance a CCC rating, the lowest rating. And then converting these ratings 
to scores between 6 to 0. The IVA ratings are in two waves (as in our sample): 1999 to 2011 and 2011 to 2014. Source: 
MSCI Intangible Value Assessment. 
Environmental 
score 
The environmental score is the environmental pillar of IVA and applies the same rating metrics based on potential risk or 
opportunity in each industry. The score rates the following issues: carbon emissions, product carbon footprint, energy 
efficiency, insurance against climate change risk, water stress, biodiversity and land use, raw material sourcing, financing 
environmental impact, toxic emissions and waste, packaging material and waste, electronic waste, opportunities in clean 
tech, opportunities in green building, opportunities in renewable energy, etc. The data are converted to a relative score by 
giving the company with the best performance in its industry sector in a given category a 10, the top score, and giving the 
company with the worst performance a 0, the lowest score. Source: MSCI Intangible Value Assessment (2011 to 2014 
wave). 
Social score 
The social score is the social pillar of IVA and applies the same rating metrics based on potential risk or opportunity in 
each industry. The score rates the following issues: labor management, human capital development, health and safety, 
supply-chain labor standards, controversial sourcing, product safety and quality, chemical safety, privacy and data 
security, responsible investing, insuring health and demographic risk, opportunities in health and nutrition, access to 
communications, access to healthcare, etc. Similar to the environmental score, the social score is industry-adjusted 
(compared within the same industry sector on a global scale) and ranges from 0 to 10. Source: MSCI Intangible Value 
Assessment (2011 to 2014 wave). 
EcoValue 
rating 
The EcoValue ratings measure a company’s environmental performance in three major areas: (1) environmental strategy 
and management, (2) environmental risks, and (3) environmental strategic profit opportunities. The rating methods are 
similar to those of the overall IVA ratings, and also range from AAA to CCC (which are then converted to 6 to 0). Source: 
RiskMetrics (provided by the MSCI Intangible Value Assessment: the 1999-2011 wave). 
Social rating 
The Social ratings measure a company’s social performance on aspects similar to those in the Social score. The rating 
methods are similar to that of the overall IVA ratings, and also range from AAA to CCC (which are then converted to 6 to 
0). Source: RiskMetrics (provided by the MSCI Intangible Value Assessment: 1999 to 2011 wave). 
Product 
responsibility 
The customer/product responsibility category measures a company’s management commitment and effectiveness in 
creating value-added products and services upholding customers’ security. It reflects a company’s capacity to maintain its 
license to operate by producing quality goods and services preserving the customer’s health, safety, integrity, and privacy. 
Includes accurate product information and labelling. Source: ASSET4 ESG data. 
Product safety 
A score measuring a company’s product quality, health and safety initiatives, and controversies related to the quality or 
safety of the company’s products, including legal cases, recalls, and criticism. The score is normalized on a scale of 0-10, 
with a higher score indicating greater product safety. Source: MSCI Intangible Value Assessment. 
Cash donations 
to cash 
The amount of cash donations to charitable (i.e., tax-exempt) organizations scaled by total cash. Cash donations include 
direct cash giving and cash giving via a corporate foundation. The variable is calculated as: Ln (1 + cash donations / 




A score measuring the extent to which the company’s directly or indirectly (through a supplier) under the spotlight of the 
media because of a controversy linked to the spill of chemicals, oils and fuels, gases (flaring), or the overall impact of the 
company on the environment. The score is normalized on a scale of 0-100. Source: ASSET4 ESG data. 
Environmental 
R&D 
A score measuring the extent to which the company invests in R&D on new environmentally friendly products or services 
that limit the amount of emissions and resources needed during product use. The score is normalized on a scale of 0-100. 
Source: ASSET4 ESG data. 
Clean energy 
products 
A score measuring the extent to which the company develops products or technologies for use in clean, renewable energy 
(such as wind, solar, hydro, geo-thermal, and biomass power). The score is normalized on a scale of 0-100. Source: 
ASSET4 ESG data. 
Sustainable 
country rating 
Country-level sovereign ESG scores and benchmarks based on 120 ESG risk and performance indicators in three areas: 
(1) environmental protection, (2) social protection and solidarity, (3) rule of law and governance. Countries are graded on 
a scale of 0-100 on their commitment and performance in the measured areas (e.g., ratification of the Kyoto convention, 




Table I (Continued)  
Description of the CSR Indices 
Panel B. Decomposition of the Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) Rating (Based on the 1999 to 2011 Wave) 
IVA Factor IVA Subscore weight Key Metrics 
Strategic 
governance 
SG1) Strategy  <2% Overall governance; rating composed of total scores of non-key issues.  
SG2) Strategic Capability 
/ Adaptability  
<2% Management of CSR issues, partnership in multi-stakeholder initiatives.  
SG3) Traditional 
Governance Concerns  
<2% 
Board independence, management of CSR issues, board diversity, compensation 
practices, controversies involving executive compensation and governance. 
Human capital 
HC1) Workplace Practices  <2% 
Workforce diversity, policies and programs to promote diversity, work/life benefits, 
discrimination-related controversies. 
HC2) Labor Relations 20% 
KEY ISSUE: Labor Relations  
Benefits, strikes, union relations, controversies, risk of work stoppages, etc. 
HC3) Health & Safety  <2% 
H&S policies and systems, implementation and monitoring of those systems, 






Customer initiatives, customer-related controversies, firm’s support for public 
policies with noteworthy benefits for stakeholders.  
SC2) Local Communities  <2% 
Policies, systems, and initiatives involving local communities (esp. indigenous 
peoples), controversies related to firm’s interactions with communities.  
SC3) Supply Chain <2% 
Policies and systems to protect supply-chain workers’ and contractors’ rights, 
initiatives for improving labor conditions, supply-chain-related controversies.  
Products and 
services 
PS1) Intellectual Capital/ 
Product Development  
<2% 
Beneficial products and services, including efforts that benefit the disadvantaged, 
reduce consumption of energy and resources, and production of hazardous 
chemicals; average of two scores.  
PS2) Product Safety  <2% 
Product quality, health and safety initiatives, controversies related to the quality or 
safety of a firm’s products, including legal cases, recalls, criticism.  
Emerging 
markets 
EM1) EM Strategy  <2% Default = 5, unless there is company-specific exposure that is highly significant.   
EM2) Human Rights/ 
Child and Forced Labor  
<2% 
Policies, support for values in Universal Declaration of Human Rights, initiatives 
to promote human rights, human rights controversies.  
EM3) Oppressive regimes  <2% Controversies, substantive involvement in countries with poor HR records.  
Environmental 
risk factors 
ER1) Historic Liabilities <2% 
Controversies including natural resource-related cases, widespread or egregious 
environmental impacts.  
ER2) Operating Risk <2% 
Emissions to air, discharges to water, emission of toxic chemicals, nuclear energy, 





Water management and use, use of recycled materials, sourcing, sustainable 
resource management, climate change policy and transparency, climate change 
initiatives, absolute and normalized emissions output, controversies.  
ER4) Industry Carbon 
Specific Risk  
25% 
KEY ISSUE: Carbon 







Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all operations, 




Board independence, management of CSR issues, board diversity, compensation 
practices, controversies involving executive compensation and governance.  
EMC3) Environmental 
Management Systems  
<2% 
Establishment and monitoring of environmental performance targets, presence of 
environmental training, stakeholder engagement.  
EMC4) Audit <2% External independent audits of environmental performance.  
EMC5) Environmental 
Accounting/Reporting  
<2% Reporting frequency, reporting quality.  
EMC6) Environmental 
Training & Development  
<2% Presence of environmental training and communications programs for employees.  




Positive and negative impact of products and services, end-of-life product 







Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all operations and reduce 
environmental impact of operations, products and services, environmental 




KEY ISSUE: Opportunities in clean technology  
Product development in clean technology, R&D relative to sales and trend, 
innovation capacity.   




Table II  
Average CSR Score across Different Legal Origins 
Overall IVA Rating is the weighted average score for different subcategories. EcoValue Rating and Social Rating are from 
RiskMetrics. A higher score indicates that the company put more effort in the area, and is marked by darker shading. 












Overall IVA Rating (full sample) 2.65 (1.58) 3.15 (1.59) 1.77 (1.53) 2.98 (1.61) 3.83 (1.50) 
Overall IVA Rating (1999 to 2011 wave) 2.72 (1.74) 3.10 (1.73) 1.26 (1.21) 2.83 (1.72) 3.93 (1.74) 
EcoValue Rating (1999 to 2011 wave) 2.65 (1.77) 2.92 (1.78) 1.20 (1.21) 3.59 (1.85) 3.88 (1.70) 
Social Rating (1999 to 2011 wave) 2.75 (1.73) 2.99 (1.75) 1.40 (1.36) 2.84 (1.63) 3.85 (1.66) 
Overall IVA Rating (2011 to 2014 wave) 2.64 (1.50) 3.16 (1.57) 1.81 (1.53) 3.02 (1.58) 3.79 (1.41) 
Environmental Score (2011 to 2014 wave) 4.68 (2.25) 5.48 (2.27) 4.07 (2.28) 5.17 (2.17) 5.63 (1.82) 
Social Score (2011 to 2014 wave) 4.55 (1.83) 5.22 (1.75) 3.67 (2.10) 4.83 (1.71) 5.45 (1.72) 
Strategic Governance 5.42 (1.85) 5.58 (1.85) 3.89 (1.57) 5.49 (1.82) 6.66 (1.73) 
Strategic Governance Strategy 5.47 (2.23) 5.91 (2.23) 4.01 (2.09) 6.01 (2.05) 6.76 (2.02) 
Strategic Capability Adaptability 5.28 (2.30) 5.63 (2.15) 3.83 (2.17) 5.76 (2.16) 6.38 (2.17) 
Traditional Governance Concerns 5.57 (1.97) 5.31 (2.00) 4.56 (2.21) 4.93 (2.07) 6.60 (1.84) 
Human Capital 5.56 (1.69) 5.88 (1.74) 4.06 (1.67) 5.44 (1.73) 6.39 (1.72) 
Employee Motivation Development 5.93 (2.00) 6.30 (2.01) 4.85 (2.12) 5.71 (1.92) 6.61 (2.10) 
Labor Relations 5.26 (1.85) 5.62 (2.03) 4.25 (2.25) 5.51 (1.76) 6.13 (2.01) 
Health Safety 5.45 (2.14) 5.51 (2.01) 3.75 (1.97) 5.27 (2.09) 6.07 (2.11) 
Stakeholder Capital 5.33 (1.87) 5.44 (1.86) 3.97 (1.25) 5.23 (1.78) 5.78 (1.91) 
Customer Stakeholder Partnerships 5.21 (2.14) 5.46 (2.14) 4.01 (2.03) 5.42 (2.00) 6.09 (2.10) 
Local Communities 5.86 (2.21) 5.63 (2.10) 4.84 (1.88) 5.51 (2.01) 5.28 (1.96) 
Supply Chain 5.12 (2.31) 5.09 (2.20) 3.65 (2.32) 5.21 (2.15) 5.75 (2.38) 
Intellectual Capital Product Develop. 5.42 (2.34) 5.78 (2.25) 3.98 (1.96) 6.18 (2.29) 6.34 (1.95) 
Product Safety 5.17 (2.02) 5.37 (2.25) 3.84 (2.34) 5.39 (2.11) 5.88 (2.07) 
Emerging Market Strategy 5.37 (1.90) 5.61 (1.87) 4.54 (1.85) 5.27 (1.80) 5.85 (1.97) 
Human Rights Child and Forced Labor 5.10 (2.12) 5.16 (2.05) 4.60 (2.08) 5.11 (1.94) 5.98 (2.13) 
Oppressive Regimes 5.11 (2.13) 5.00 (1.98) 4.78 (2.08) 4.97 (1.97) 5.34 (2.05) 
Environment (Overall) 4.66 (1.64) 4.87 (1.76) 3.06 (1.29) 5.49 (1.70) 5.70 (1.56) 
Environmental Risk Factors 5.13 (1.92) 5.09 (1.75) 3.57 (1.38) 5.47 (1.57) 6.03 (1.40) 
Historic Liabilities 5.22 (2.59) 4.92 (2.35) 3.21 (1.64) 5.25 (2.14) 6.02 (2.03) 
Operating Risk 4.96 (2.40) 4.52 (2.46) 3.01 (2.08) 5.14 (2.22) 5.59 (2.48) 
Leading Sustainability Risk Indicator 4.80 (2.02) 5.01 (1.99) 3.41 (1.65) 5.63 (1.94) 5.83 (1.90) 
Industry Specific Carbon Risk 4.35 (2.59) 4.39 (2.75) 3.66 (2.35) 4.84 (2.54) 5.33 (2.38) 
Environmental Mgmt. Capacity 4.07 (2.19) 4.55 (2.13) 3.21 (1.76) 5.46 (2.13) 5.59 (2.17) 
Environmental Strategy 4.93 (2.41) 5.34 (2.38) 4.06 (2.13) 6.15 (2.28) 6.54 (2.24) 
Corporate Governance 4.00 (2.45) 4.06 (2.30) 3.38 (2.18) 5.09 (2.31) 4.90 (2.31) 
Environmental Management Systems 3.93 (2.57) 4.68 (2.66) 2.98 (2.20) 5.83 (2.64) 5.77 (2.62) 
Audit  4.03 (2.77) 4.26 (2.79) 3.36 (2.66) 5.35 (2.84) 5.20 (2.94) 
Environmental Accounting/ Reporting 3.54 (2.54) 4.26 (2.47) 2.72 (2.18) 5.57 (2.90) 5.39 (2.71) 
Environmental Training Development 4.18 (2.77) 4.71 (2.64) 3.52 (2.62) 5.67 (2.60) 5.69 (2.84) 
Certification  2.75 (2.54) 3.07 (2.52) 2.13 (2.11) 3.46 (2.55) 3.57 (2.85) 
Products Materials 3.51 (2.53) 4.11 (2.43) 2.28 (1.81) 4.94 (2.68) 5.36 (2.61) 
Environmental Opportunity Factors 5.14 (1.89) 5.17 (2.09) 4.17 (1.62) 5.59 (1.90) 6.09 (1.83) 
Strategic Competence 4.38 (2.54) 4.92 (2.48) 3.52 (1.93) 6.06 (2.43) 5.98 (2.51) 
Environmental Opportunity 4.47 (2.25) 4.93 (2.21) 3.49 (1.83) 5.75 (2.21) 5.87 (2.08) 




Table III  
Non-parametric Tests on the Means of CSR indices by Legal Origin 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test compares legal origins to assess whether their population firm-year mean ranks differ. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
















Civil vs. common legal origin 85.010*** 82.855*** 80.125*** 76.784*** 20.492*** 57.952*** 18.915*** 
French vs. English origin 66.356*** 64.520*** 69.198*** 74.000*** 16.631*** 15.241*** 12.046*** 
German vs. English origin 44.281*** 45.354*** 44.484*** 32.746*** 5.932*** 58.977*** 5.906*** 
Scandinavian vs. English origin 68.193*** 59.590*** 37.251*** 40.801*** 30.167*** 40.474*** 32.592*** 
French vs. German origin 16.692*** 13.235*** 20.393*** 34.411*** 10.060*** -30.546*** 6.623*** 
French vs. Scandinavian origin -36.843*** -30.505*** -3.232*** -9.323*** -19.514*** -28.764*** -23.121*** 
German vs. Scandinavian origin -45.155*** -36.963*** -15.533*** -27.377*** -26.137*** -8.600*** -29.329*** 




Main Results on CSR and Legal Origin 
The dependent variable (DV) is the ordinal (ranging from 0 to 6) CSR rating from MSCI IVA. Model (1) is estimated using a pooled OLS regression, models (2) to (5) 
are estimated using random-effects GLS, and models (6) and (7) are estimated using random effects ordered probit. All models control for year and industry fixed 
effects. Definitions of the dependent variables are in Table I and of the independent variable in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
DV = IVA Rating Pooled OLS  GLS GLS GLS GLS  
RE ordered 
probit 
RE ordered probit 
(socialist relabelled) 
French Civil Origin 0.468**  0.521** 0.555*** 0.581*** 0.905***  0.234*** 1.801*** 
 
(0.213)  (0.212) (0.215) (0.216) (0.249)  (0.0168) (0.0176) 
German Civil Origin 0.355***  0.524*** 0.541*** 0.556*** 0.845***  0.124*** 0.0848*** 
 
(0.131)  (0.179) (0.176) (0.171) (0.188)  (0.0125) (0.0138) 
Scandinavian Civil Origin 0.502***  0.757*** 0.801*** 0.800*** 1.027***  1.881*** 1.862*** 
 
(0.177)  (0.188) (0.171) (0.177) (0.198)  (0.025) (0.0238) 
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.454**  -0.0808 -0.0912 -0.0688 -0.062  0.0112 -0.00774 
 
(0.175)  (0.101) (0.0941) (0.0973) (0.101)  (0.0148) (0.0101) 
Ln(Total assets) 0.0757***  0.0341*** 0.0337*** 0.0323*** 0.0328***  
  
 
(0.025)  (0.010) (0.0098) (0.0100) (0.010)  
  ROA (winsorized .05) -0.0357  0.0282* 0.0279* 0.027 0.0263*  0.0157* 0.0224*** 
 
(0.024)  (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0178) (0.018)  (0.008) (0.00343) 
Globalization Index 0.0351***  0.0275** 0.0271** 0.0274** 0.0337***  
  
 
(0.0124)  (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0123)  
  Regulatory Quality -0.121  0.104 0.0787 0.0753 0.0868  0.141*** 0.221*** 
 
(0.354)  (0.155) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161)  (0.032) (0.028) 
Corruption Control 0.608***  0.083 0.0748 0.0698 0.0338  -0.052*** -0.0675*** 
 
(0.195)  (0.126) (0.125) (0.124) (0.126)  (0.019) (0.022) 
Political Exec. Constraints 0.0222  -0.0029 -0.00284 -0.00486 -0.005  -0.012*** 0.00954*** 
 
(0.0227)  (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0035) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) 









(0.0095) (0.0096) (0.010)  








(0.0298) (0.030)  (0.00472) (0.004) 
Anti-Director Rights Index 
 
 





   
(0.066)  
  Observations 201,420  201,420 201,324 195,378 193,982  195,474 201,836 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Table V  
Robustness Tests: Alternative Theories  
This table repeats the GLS estimations of model (2) of Table IV but adds control variables on ownership concentration and ownership by type of shareholder (Panel A) and cultural 
dimensions (Panel B).Variable definitions are given in Table I and Appendix A.  
Panel A. Blockholder Ownership 
DV = IVA Rating (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
French Civil Origin 0.572*** 0.591*** 0.575*** 0.596*** 0.592*** 0.596*** 0.582*** 0.579*** 0.584*** 0.584*** 
 
(0.216) (0.216) (0.221) (0.218) (0.220) (0.212) (0.217) (0.216) (0.212) (0.212) 
German Civil Origin 0.540*** 0.550*** 0.538*** 0.556*** 0.551*** 0.552*** 0.549*** 0.542*** 0.549*** 0.549*** 
 
(0.165) (0.169) (0.169) (0.165) (0.171) (0.168) (0.170) (0.171) (0.170) (0.170) 
Scandinavian Civil Origin 0.811*** 0.802*** 0.792*** 0.826*** 0.804*** 0.804*** 0.800*** 0.800*** 0.799*** 0.798*** 
 
(0.169) (0.175) (0.180) (0.170) (0.179) (0.177) (0.180) (0.176) (0.178) (0.178) 
Government Held Shares % 0.0296 0.0301 
        
 
(0.263) (0.244) 
        Corporation Held Shares % 0.0451 
 
0.104 





       Pension Fund Held Shares % -1.205* 
  
-1.321* 





      Investment Companies Held Shares % -0.0227 
   
0.00840 
     
 
(0.138) 
   
(0.143) 
     Employees Held Shares % -0.146 
    
-0.181 
    
 
(0.389) 
    
(0.379) 
    Other Holdings % 0.207 
     
0.269 
   
 
(0.210) 
     
(0.264) 
   Foreign Held Shares % 0.227 





      
(0.216) 
  Total Strategic Holdings % 
        
0.0420 
 
         
(0.111) 
 Total Free-float Shares % 
         
-0.0435 
          
(0.114) 
Observations 196,232 196,232 196,232 196,232 196,232 196,232 196,232 196,232 196,232 196,232 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table V (Continued) 
Robustness Tests: Alternative Theories 
Panel B. Cultures 
DV = IVA Rating (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
 
       French Civil Origin 0.774*** 0.667*** 0.633*** 0.667*** 0.465* 0.507** 0.579*** 
 
(0.282) (0.226) (0.243) (0.229) (0.268) (0.213) (0.201) 
German Civil Origin 0.873*** 0.600*** 0.635*** 0.445** 0.421* 0.101 0.471** 
 
(0.185) (0.179) (0.233) (0.179) (0.241) (0.428) (0.202) 
Scandinavian Civil Origin 0.660*** 0.749*** 0.822*** 1.116*** 0.796*** 0.762*** 0.803*** 
 
(0.179) (0.175) (0.206) (0.236) (0.183) (0.173) (0.175) 
Protestant 0.201 
      
 
(0.155) 
      Hofstede Power Distance 
 
-0.00498 
     
  
(0.00767) 
     Hofstede Individualism 
  
0.00178 
    
   
(0.00497) 
    Hofstede Masculinity 
   
0.00739* 
   
    
(0.00407) 
   Hofstede Uncertainty Avoidance 
    
0.00405 
  
     
(0.00626) 
  Hofstede Long-Term Orientation 
     
0.00926 
 
      
(0.00670) 
 Hofstede Indulgence 
      
-0.00679 
       
(0.00522) 
Observations 185,705 199,938 199,938 199,938 199,938 197,295 196,628 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table VI  
Robustness Tests: Alternative Dependent Variables 
This table shows 20 different models estimated using the same methodology and the same control variables as model (2) of Table IV, but with different CSR indices from the MSCI IVA ratings as 
dependent variables. The definitions are given in Table I. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
























              
 
  
  French Civil Origin 0.699*** 1.108*** 0.566*** 0.514* 1.087** 0.566*** 0.611** 0.709* 0.592** 0.597*** 
 
(0.219) (0.244) (0.198) (0.311) (0.442) (0.198) (0.306) (0.379) (0.279) (0.225) 
German Civil Origin 0.490*** 0.743*** 0.445* 0.536** 0.780*** 0.445* 0.648*** 0.743** 0.305 0.607** 
 
(0.189) (0.213) (0.261) (0.232) (0.301) (0.261) (0.163) (0.305) (0.250) (0.283) 
Scandinavian Civil Origin 0.748*** 0.591* 0.931*** 0.727*** 1.117*** 0.931*** 0.815*** 1.260*** 0.374* 0.929*** 
 
(0.275) (0.315) (0.258) (0.273) (0.349) (0.258) (0.173) (0.194) (0.201) (0.143) 
Observations 167,076 156,621 167,075 39,769 75,303 51,193 51,224 75,047 51,462 50,521 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 





























     
     
French Civil Origin 0.695* 0.389 0.0975 0.621 0.720 1.042* 0.822* 0.942** 0.661 0.542 
 
(0.382) (0.332) (0.241) (0.490) (0.518) (0.611) (0.433) (0.453) (0.490) (0.355) 
German Civil Origin 0.774*** 0.678** 0.451* 0.975*** 1.266*** 1.385*** 0.908*** 1.048*** 1.179*** 0.789*** 
 
(0.295) (0.273) (0.273) (0.330) (0.417) (0.416) (0.351) (0.312) (0.385) (0.286) 
Scandinavian Civil Origin 1.258*** 0.854** 0.634* 1.292*** 1.691*** 1.745*** 1.300*** 1.788*** 1.380*** 1.247*** 
 
(0.192) (0.332) (0.370) (0.407) (0.513) (0.475) (0.340) (0.417) (0.305) (0.206) 
Observations 75,632 75,054 64,862 75,638 75,689 75,436 75,252 75,373 75,518 75,236 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table VII  
Robustness Tests: Alternative CSR Samples 
This table repeats the GLS estimations of model (2) of Table IV but uses alternative samples (Vigeo Corporate ESG sample and ASSET4 ESG sample) with different ESG sub-indices 
as dependent variables (human resources, environment, customer and supplier, community involvement, human rights, corporate governance from Vigeo Corporate ESG; and the 
environment and social scores from ASSET4 ESG) as defined in Appendix A. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
 
 Vigeo Corporate ESG Sample  ASSET4 ESG Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 















    
    
  
French Civil Origin 16.74*** 18.58*** 7.663*** 3.205** 6.516*** -16.12***  8.330* 12.83*** 
 
(5.056) (6.882) (2.614) (1.379) (2.163) (3.750)  (4.646) (4.815) 
German Civil Origin 12.69*** 9.227** 5.787*** 1.374 3.410** -17.86***  12.80*** 3.598 
 
(4.680) (4.027) (1.937) (0.889) (1.326) (3.454)  (3.414) (3.170) 
Scandinavian Civil Origin 18.90*** 12.92** 7.379*** 3.191** 10.37*** -2.223  16.34*** 14.27*** 
 
(3.507) (6.202) (2.544) (1.308) (1.520) (4.218)  (3.975) (5.244) 
Observations 7,765 8,341 4,163 5,786 7,707 8,341  20,692 20,692 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 






Table VIII  
Evidence from Scandals and Disasters: Direct Effects on CSR 
The dependent variables are product responsibility (from ASSET4) and product safety (from MSCI IVA) ratings in Panel A, the amount of corporate donations (from Datastream) in 
Panel B, and the spill and pollution control index, the environmental R&D investment score, and the clean energy product score (from ASSET4) in Panel C. The 
differences-in-differences (DiD) estimator is the coefficient on “Civil Law × Post-2009” in Panel A, the coefficient on “Civil Law × Year 2005” in Panel B, and the coefficients on 
“Civil Law × Year 2010” and “Civil Law × Post-2010” in Panel C. The control variables are the same as in Table VII. All regressions control for country, year, and industry fixed 
effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel A.  
Chinese Milk Scandal 
 
Panel B. 
Indian Ocean Tsunami 
 
Panel C.  
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 































      Civil Law × Post-2009 5.344** 0.667***  
 
 
      
 
(2.693) (0.196)  
 
 
      Civil Law × Year-2005 
 
  16.87*  
      
  
  (9.563)  




 6.393** 7.578** 6.587** 




 (2.801) (2.944) (2.691) 





   





   





      Observations 1,212 2,380  10,353  1,522 1,509 1,522 1,522 1,509 1,522 
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Table IX  
Evidence from Scandals and Disasters: Placebo Tests 
This table reports placebo tests related to the results of Table VIII. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the product responsibility score (from ASSET4) for which 
differences-in-differences (DiD) estimation is conducted for industries not expected to be affected by the Chinese milk scandal. In Panel B, a DiD estimation is performed for the spill 
and pollution control index, the environmental R&D investment score, and the clean energy product score (from ASSET4) on industries not expected to be affected by the oil spill 
disaster. In Panel C, a DiD estimation is performed for cash donations on years not expected to be affected by the tsunami disaster. The control variables are the same as in Table VIII. 
All regressions control for country, year, and industry fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
Panel A. Chinese Milk Scandal: Alternative Industries 
 
Oil & Gas Software & IT Services Professional & Commercial Services Financials 
DV = Product Responsibility (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
  
  
Civil Law × Post-2009 4.159 0.291 -4.583 15.87 
 
(3.846) (4.723) (4.669) (13.53) 
     Observations 1,517 665 780 1,754 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Alternative Industries 
 
Consumer Goods Software & IT Services Professional & Commercial Services Financials 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 

































                          
Civil Law × Post-2010 0.746 4.667 2.508 1.114 4.001 5.968 2.535 9.553 -5.261 0.812 -2.383 -8.779*** 
 
(0.950) (3.747) (1.981) (0.807) (4.970) (4.140) (1.580) (9.962) (4.543) (0.942) (6.074) (2.367) 
             Observations 2,381 1,296 2,382 663 652 667 773 264 780 216 101 1,759 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table IX (Continued)  
Evidence from Scandals and Disasters: Placebo Tests 
Panel C. Indian Ocean Tsunami: Alternative Years 
DV = Cash Donation/Cash (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Civil Law × Year-2004 11.82 
         
 
(18.03) 
         Civil Law × Year-2005 
 
16.87* 
        
  
(9.563) 
        Civil Law × Year-2006 
  
-15.90 
       
   
(9.813) 
       Civil Law × Year-2007 
   
2.971 
      
    
(6.119) 
      Civil Law × Year-2008 
    
10.79 
     
     
(9.493) 
     Civil Law × Year-2009 
     
5.840 
    
      
(7.049) 
    Civil Law × Year-2010 
      
-24.80 
   
       
(19.77) 
   Civil Law × Year-2011 
       
-0.233 
  
        
(6.389) 
  Civil Law × Year-2012 
        
4.664 
 
         
(11.88) 
 Civil Law × Year-2013 
         
-0.888 
          
(7.778) 
Observations 10,353 10,353 10,353 10,353 10,353 10,353 10,353 10,353 10,353 10,353 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table X  
Evidence from Scandals and Disasters: The Role of Consumer Demand 
This table reports results on changes in market shares in the food industry and the oil and gas industry following the Chinese milk scandal (Panel A) 
and the oil spill disaster (Panel B), respectively. Each panel also reports results of the relation between changes in firm CSR indices such as product 
responsibility and spill and pollution control scores and changes in consumer demand (proxied by changes in market share) across different legal 
regimes following these two shocks. Each model includes country, industry, and year fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses.  
Panel A. Chinese Milk Scandal and Domestic Market Shares 
  DV = Domestic Market Shares 
 
DV = Product Responsibility (ASSET4) 
      
Civil Law  




(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5)   (6) 
         Post-2009 -20.18*** 
       
 
(2.318) 
       Post-2009 × Civil Law 
 
-6.387*** 
      
  
(2.379) 
      Year 2009 
  
-1.433 
     
   
(1.022) 
     Year 2009 × Civil Law 
   
1.265 
    
    
(1.194) 
    Market Shares 








Post-2009 × Market Shares  





























Table X (Continued) 
Evidence from Scandals and Disasters: The Roles of Consumer Demands 
Panel B. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Scandal and International Market Shares 
   DV = international market shares 
 
DV = spill and pollution control 
 






(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5)  (6) 
         Post-2010 -0.0012*** 
       
 
(0.0004) 
       Post-2010 × Civil law 
 
-0.0028 
      
  
(0.0019) 
      Year-2010 
  
-0.0017*** 
     
   
(0.0004) 
     Year-2010 × Civil law 
   
-0.003 
    
    
(0.002) 
    Market shares 








Post-2010 × Market shares 




























Table XI  
Economic Mechanisms 
This table reports results on potential mechanisms (“channels”) behind the link between legal origin and CSR. The channel variables include the shareholder litigation index, supermajority 
rule, the employment laws index, the collective bargaining laws index, and state involvement in the economy. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Each set of tests contains 
two-stages of regressions (but not an IV regression). In the first stage, a channel variable is regressed on the civil law origin dummy; and in the second stage, the overall IVA rating is 
regressed on the channel variable “predicted” from the first-stage regression. The same control variables as in model (2) of Table IV are included in both stages. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses. 
 


























           
























        
  
(0.059) 
        
Supermajority  
   
1.702*** 
      
    
(0.0983) 
      
Employment Laws 
     
2.362*** 
    
      
(0.119) 
    
Collective Bargaining Laws 
       
2.069*** 
  




         
15.55*** 
          
(1.353) 
Observations 199,769 199,769 69,799 69,799 200,492 200,492 200,492 200,492 134,424 134,424 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix A  
Definitions of Independent Variables 
Variable Definition 
Laws and Regulation 
Legal Origins 
The legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country in which the focal firm is 
headquartered. We distinguish five major legal origins: English common law, French commercial code (civil 
law), German commercial code (civil law), Scandinavian civil law, and socialist (former or current) law. In 
alternative specifications, socialist law is classified as either French civil law (e.g., Russian Federation) or 





The Anti-Director Rights Index (ADRI) was first developed by LLSV (1998) as a measure of investor 
protection against corporate management, and later revised by La Porta et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). All 
three ADRIs consist of the same six key components: (1) proxy by mail allowed; (2) shares not blocked 
before shareholder meeting; (3) cumulative voting/ proportional representation; (4) oppressed minority 
protection; (5) preemptive rights to new share issues; and (6) percentage of share capital to call an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting. Each component is a dummy variable and the ADRI is formed by 
aggregating the value of all six components. The index ranges from 0 to 6, whereby a higher value of the 




The shareholder litigation index is from the “judicial remedies” component of the ADRI and measures 
whether shareholders can challenge resolutions of the board and/or management if they are “unfair, 
prejudicial, oppressive, or abusive.” It equals one if the company law or commercial code grants shareholders 
either a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of management or of the assembly or the right to step out of 
the company by requiring the company to purchase their shares when they object to certain fundamental 
changes, such as mergers, asset dispositions, and changes in the articles of incorporation, and zero otherwise. 
Minority shareholders are defined as those shareholders who own 10% of share capital or less. Source: LLSV 
(1998), La Porta et al. (2008), Spamann (2010). 
Employment 
Laws Index 
This index measures the protection of labor and employment laws, calculated as the average of alternative 
employment contracts, the cost of increasing hours worked, the cost of firing workers, and dismissal 




This index measures the protection of collective bargaining laws as the average of labor union power and 





Political Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): (1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on 
the political executive’s actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups 
and assassinations); (2) Intermediate Category; (3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Political Executive 
Authority: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive; (4) Intermediate Category; (5) 
Substantial Limitations on Political Executive Authority: The executive has more effective authority than any 
group to which is it is accountable but the executive is subject to substantial constraints that group imposes on 
it; (6) Intermediate Category; (7) Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective 
authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Source: Polity IV. 
Corruption 
Control 
The extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as the “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. Coded from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes. Source: World Governance Indicator – World Bank. 
Regulatory 
Quality 
The ability of the government to implement sound policies and regulations that promote private sector 
development. Coded from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. 






The Heritage Index of Economic Freedom focuses on four key aspects of the economic environment over 
which governments typically exercise policy control: rule of law (including property rights and freedom from 
corruption), government size (including fiscal freedom and government spending), regulatory efficiency 
(including business freedom – the efficiency of government regulation of business, labor freedom, and 
monetary freedom), and market openness (including trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial 
freedom). The index ranges from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicating the country has a higher degree of 
freedom (e.g. 0 indicating “repressive” and 100 indicating “negligible government interference”). More 
detailed definitions of each individual category of freedom can be found at: www.heritage.org. Source: 
Heritage Index of Economic Freedom. 
Economic Development 
GDP per Capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of the gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included 
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for the depreciation of fabricated 




The KOF Index of Globalization measures three main dimensions of globalization: (1) economic, (2) social, 
and (3) political. In addition to the three indices measuring these dimensions, an overall index of globalization 
and sub-indices are also calculated, which capture (1) actual economic flows, (2) economic restrictions, (3) 
data on information flows, (4) data on personal contact, and (5) data on cultural proximity. Data are available 
on a yearly basis over the period 1970 to 2010. A higher score indicates a higher degree of globalization. 
Source: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH). 
State 
Involvement  
Fraction of non-agricultural GDP due to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Source: World Bank. 
Culture 
Power Distance 
“Power distance” is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. A higher score indicates 
a large power distance between individuals. Source: Hofstede and Hofstede (2005). 
Individualism 
“Individualism” refers to the degree of interdependence among members of a group and defines people’s 
self-image in terms of “I” or “We.” In individualist societies, people focus on themselves and their immediate 
family whereas in collectivist societies people belong to “in-groups” that take care of them in exchange for 
loyalty. A higher score indicates more individualism. Source: Ibid. 
Masculinity / 
Femininity 
A high score on the “Masculinity/femininity” dimension indicates that a masculine society is driven by 
competition, achievement, and success, with success being defined by the “winner” or “best-in-field.” A low 
score means that the dominant values in the feminine society consist of caring for others and quality of life. A 
feminine society is one where quality of life is the sign of success and standing out from the crowd is not 
admirable. Source: Ibid. 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
“Uncertainty avoidance” captures how a society deals with the fact that the future is uncertain and the extent 
to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created 
beliefs and institutions that try to avoid uncertainty. A higher score implies a higher level of uncertainty 
avoidance. Source: Ibid. 
Pragmatism 
“Pragmatism” describes how society reconcile some links with its past while responding to the challenges of 
the present and future. Normative societies who score low, prefer to maintain time-honored traditions while 
viewing societal change with suspicion. Societies with a high score encourage thrift and efforts in modern 
education as a way to prepare for the future. Source: Ibid. 
Indulgence / 
Restraint 
This dimension captures the extent to which people try to control their desires and impulses, based on the way 
they were raised. Relatively weak control scores high on “Indulgence” and relatively strong control scores 
high on “Restraint.” Source: Ibid. 
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Protestant A binary variable that indicates if the country has a Protestant majority or not. Source: Chen (2012). 
Ownership and Board Structure 
Government 
Held Shares % 
The percentage of total shares held by a government or government institution if these holdings amount to 5% 
or more of the company’s total shares. Source: Datastream. 
Corporation 
Held Shares % 
The percentage of total shares held by one company in another if these holdings amount to 5% or more of the 
company’s total shares. Source: Datastream. 
Pension Fund 
Held Shares % 
The percentage of total shares held by pension funds or endowment funds if these holdings amount to 5% or 




The percentage of total shares held as long-term strategic holdings by investment banks or institutions seeking 
a long-term return if these holdings amount to 5% or more of the company’s total shares. Holdings by hedge 
funds are not included. Source: Datastream. 
Employees Held 
Shares % 
The percentage of total shares held by employees, or by those with a substantial position in a company that 
provides significant voting power at an annual general meeting (typically family members) if these holdings 
amount to 5% or more of the company’s total shares. Source: Datastream. 
Other 
Holdings % 
The percentage of total shares held strategically, and outside one of the above categories (government, 
corporations, pension funds, investment companies, employees), if these holdings amount to 5% or more of 
the company’s total shares. Source: Datastream. 
Foreign Held 
Shares % 
The percentage of total shares held by a shareholder domiciled in a country other than that of the issuer if 
these holdings amount to 5% or more of the company’s total shares. Source: Datastream. 
Total Strategic 
Holdings % 
The percentage of total shares held strategically and not available to ordinary investors if these holdings 
amount to 5% or more of the company’s total shares. Holdings of 5% or more held by the hedge fund owner 
type or the investment advisor/hedge fund owner type are regarded as active, and not counted as strategic. 
Total strategic holdings represent the sum of all the above categories (government, corporations, pension 
fund, investment company, employees, other holdings, foreign held, etc.). Source: Datastream. 
Total Free 
Floats % 
The percentage of total shares available to ordinary investors or the total number of shares less the strategic 
holdings as defined above. Source: Datastream. 
Supermajority 
Rule 
Dummy variable equal to one if the company has a supermajority vote requirement (75%) or qualified 
majority for amendments of charters and bylaws or lock-in provisions. Source: ASSET4 (Thomson Reuters), 
BoardEx, and Orbis. 
Financial Variables 
ROA 
Return on assets: net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat Global and Compustat North 
America, cross-validated and supplemented with Datastream. 
Tobin’s Q 
The sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt, divided by the sum of the book value of 
equity and the book value of debt (MTB assets). Source: Datastream. 
Firm Size 
The logarithm of total assets. Total assets reported in local currencies are converted to US dollars using the 
corresponding year-end exchange rates. Source: Compustat Global and Compustat North America, 
cross-validated and supplemented by means of Datastream. 
Market Shares 




Appendix B. MSCI IVA Sample Country (Region) Distribution 
Country IVA Legal origin obs. Country IVA Legal origin obs. 
United Arab Emirates 2.390 English 372 Korea, Republic of 2.652 German 6,948 
Netherlands Antilles 2.437 French 135 Kuwait 3.056 French 18 
Argentina 3.606 French 648 Cayman Islands 2.689 English 4,668 
Austria 3.231 German 1,431 Kazakhstan 0.870 French 92 
Australia 3.117 English 18,237 Lebanon 5.000 French 27 
Aruba 2.407 French 108 Sri Lanka 3.362 English 94 
Azerbaijan 2.000 French 4 Lithuania 4.577 French 26 
Barbados 1.691 English 81 Luxembourg 3.031 French 2,657 
Bangladesh 3.380 English 50 Latvia 3.941 German 17 
Belgium 3.159 French 1,720 Morocco 3.272 French 305 
Burkina Faso 3.111 French 27 Monaco 4.000 French 11 
Bulgaria 3.000 Socialist 44 Macao 1.543 French 140 
Bermuda 2.102 English 1,866 Malta 2.494 French 87 
Brazil 2.757 French 5,233 Mauritius 2.400 French 35 
Bahamas 2.088 English 147 Malawi 5.815 English 27 
Botswana 4.467 English 107 Mexico 2.376 French 2,644 
Belarus 2.000 French 24 Malaysia 2.039 English 3,615 
Canada 2.906 English 17,851 Namibia 5.173 English 81 
Switzerland 3.396 German 6,326 Nigeria 4.809 English 89 
Côte d'Ivoire 3.115 French 139 Netherlands 3.520 French 6,758 
Chile 2.769 French 1,317 Norway 3.685 Scandinavian 1,736 
China 1.126 Socialist 5,165 New Zealand 3.669 English 1,515 
Colombia 2.848 French 961 Oman 2.089 French 45 
Costa Rica 3.861 French 101 Panama 3.225 French 111 
Curaçao 1.971 French 314 Peru 3.285 French 855 
Cyprus 2.205 English 44 Papua New Guinea 2.588 English 80 
Czech Republic 3.142 Socialist 607 Philippines 2.001 French 867 
Germany 3.559 German 7,557 Pakistan 3.311 English 209 
Denmark 3.689 Scandinavian 2,013 Poland 2.752 Socialist 1,168 
Dominican Republic 2.000 French 17 Puerto Rico 2.339 French 401 
Egypt 2.433 French 356 Palestine, State of 3.056 English 18 
Spain 3.673 French 4,528 Portugal 3.339 French 1,077 
Finland 3.817 Scandinavian 2,166 Paraguay 4.519 French 54 
Faroe Islands 2.000 French 5 Qatar 2.794 French 136 
France 3.882 French 9,954 Romania 3.236 Socialist 187 
Gabon 3.000 French 27 Serbia 0.000 Socialist 24 
United Kingdom 3.450 English 35,437 Russian Federation 1.908 Socialist 2,296 
Georgia 5.000 German 8 Saudi Arabia 3.690 English 29 
Guernsey 2.209 English 521 Sweden 3.969 Scandinavian 4,500 
Ghana 4.278 English 54 Singapore 2.894 English 3,665 
Gibraltar 4.105 English 76 Slovakia 3.411 Socialist 248 
Greece 2.438 French 995 El Salvador 3.118 French 17 
Hong Kong 1.786 English 7,304 Togo 5.000 French 1 
Croatia 2.974 German 78 Thailand 2.647 English 1,302 
Hungary 3.130 Socialist 442 Tunisia 4.000 French 9 
Indonesia 2.607 French 2,104 Turkey 2.205 French 1,473 
Ireland 2.748 English 2,897 Trinidad and Tobago 4.368 English 19 
Israel 2.459 English 1,008 Taiwan 1.792 German 4,233 
Isle of Man 1.057 English 106 Ukraine 2.822 French 309 
India 1.990 English 5,475 Uganda 5.725 English 51 
Iceland 1.600 Scandinavian 40 U.S.A. 2.460 English 157,085 
Italy 3.142 French 5,992 Uruguay 6.000 French 10 
Jersey 2.264 English 1,452 Venezuela 3.119 French 84 
Jamaica 3.982 English 56 Virgin Islands, British 1.534 English 1,831 
Jordan 4.000 French 26 Virgin Islands, US 1.364 English 22 
Japan 3.040 German 30,779 South Africa 3.131 English 4,776 
Kenya 4.642 English 159 Zambia 4.380 English 158 
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Legal origin Obs. 
Austria 39.85 22.11 40.04 40.87 38.81 33.63 German 103 
Australia 18.48 27.81 36.18 68.1 38.3 29.54 English 259 
Belgium 42.54 50.55 42.77 40.29 40.33 39.28 French 179 
Bermuda 14  22.5 24 35 35.5 English 4 
Brazil 39.64 46 28.25 37.25 40.76 31.53 French 72 
Canada 19.66 41.05 34.15 60.17 42.38 29.83 English 272 
Cayman Islands 4 30 44.5 19  26 English 3 
Chile 9.33 49.83 23.11 26.86 30.16 27.64 French 22 
China 20.87 15.59 25.81 37.39 35.08 25.94 Socialist 54 
Colombia  19.33 49.4 35.15 37.92 34.92 French 13 
Czech Republic 50.67 51.33  49.67 19 22 Socialist 3 
Denmark 30.25 39.14 42.35 48.01 39.07 38.09 Scandinavian 119 
Egypt    28 28.5 24 French 2 
Finland 40.44 55.93 43.64 66.37 39.68 39.69 Scandinavian 168 
France 52.58 62.27 50.95 40.25 46.65 46.75 French 1,423 
Germany 50.99 47.24 43.79 34.7 41.89 43.13 German 898 
Greece 27.66 27 34.33 30.33 41.25 34.38 French 47 
Hong Kong 10.12 12.29 30.97 37.75 35.99 25.45 English 208 
Hungary 44.5 42  27.14 27.33 56.43 Socialist 7 
Iceland 7.5   47.5  25 Scandinavian 4 
India 30.22 23.56 32.23 35.94 36.31 29.81 English 52 
Indonesia 18 15 33.33 33.96 41.24 28.76 French 25 
Ireland 15.55 8.15 27.5 42.14 36.18 24.31 English 90 
Italy 44.32 49.8 39.99 41.87 41.97 40.45 French 395 
Japan 18.59 33.41 41.19 21.47 35.6 29.5 German 1,114 
Korea, Republic of 20.41 38.79 29.84 26.46 36.62 26.44 German 96 
Luxembourg 28.83 14 36.33 32.57 30.95 25.46 French 32 
Malaysia 7 33.44 26 48.29 37.23 25.69 English 35 
Mexico 34.42 14.56 34.45 28.49 40.45 30.86 French 35 
Morocco 25.14 24.47 38.67 6.56 46 31.72 French 98 
Namibia 25.42 27.16 41.06 48.4 42.2 30.87 English 262 
Netherlands 38.7 40.87 46.74 61.98 40.75 40.26 French 403 
New Zealand 7.42  36.11 71.54 29.56 25 English 13 
Norway 39.93 43.33 35.19 61.38 47.77 44.52 Scandinavian 94 
Peru 50 30  32 39 28 French 1 
Philippines  38.67 28 32.67 39.27 23.92 French 12 
Poland 23 33 27.75 39.08 32.67 24.67 Socialist 12 
Portugal 39.08 45.8 48.2 36.83 42.91 39.88 French 84 
Russian Federation 27.83 42 27.33 39.55 28.88 28.78 Socialist 20 
Singapore 11.71 18.75 33 49.84 39.14 27.24 English 92 
South Africa 32.79 14.67 27.79 54.63 41.37 31.67 English 48 
Spain 41.61 43.1 40.32 33.49 40.81 41.77 French 427 
Sweden 42.63 45.39 48.58 58.88 41.79 45.2 Scandinavian 237 
Switzerland 28.78 47.41 39.09 53.38 35.47 36.02 German 427 
Taiwan 14.25 15.47 26.08 19.99 34.79 25.46 German 74 
Thailand 18 19.5 32.57 36.64 31.37 25.5 English 22 
Turkey   27.5 25.19 34.5 24.81 French 16 
U.S.A. 12.4 26.49 32.22 48.85 37.78 27.91 English 2,201 
United Arab Emirates 9 0 27 27.25 31.5 24.75 English 4 
United Kingdom 25.06 47.51 41.37 69.33 37.19 34.97 English 1,482 
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Abu Dhabi (UAE) 19.65 38.32 25.68 French 12 Kuwait 18.92 24.30 36.60 French 48 
Austria 43.29 38.13 38.77 German 4,020 Luxembourg 55.00 58.48 52.83 French 60 
Australia 44.46 51.84 50.40 English 252 Malaysia 42.32 41.12 50.21 English 540 
Belgium 53.16 54.88 49.63 French 336 Mexico 38.96 46.03 49.47 French 324 
Brazil 55.02 55.19 67.72 French 1,008 Morocco 21.57 20.13 53.42 French 36 
Canada 47.59 37.64 38.65 English 3,864 Netherlands 75.30 68.86 75.36 French 540 
Channel Islands 52.05 49,82 53.02 French 24 New Zealand 49.47 45.42 42.40 English 144 
Chile 33.41 43.66 45.61 French 252 Nigeria 7.18 10.89 19.71 English 12 
China 25.59 33.38 32.78 Socialist 984 Norway 56.90 55.26 58.87 Scandinavia 300 
Colombia 34.40 34.52 40.94 French 108 Oman 27.00 27.42 33.00 French 12 
Cyprus 39.18 30.20 36.71 English 12 Peru 41.33 31.05 34.41 French 12 
Czech Republic 48.56 48.72 60.01 Socialist 48 Philippines 39.59 36.07 40.79 French 252 
Denmark 48.45 56.43 52.69 Scandinavian 324 Poland 33.22 33.62 42.06 Socialist 312 
Dubai (UAE) 37.39 44.24 33.76 French 12 Portugal 67.52 66.20 73.95 French 144 
Egypt 14.55 19.29 27.22 French 132 Qatar 10.77 12.87 24.64 French 24 
Finland 72.26 73.25 66.86 Scandinavian 324 Russian Federation 37.52 39.92 50.64 Socialist 408 
France 71.45 75.70 76.36 French 1,212 Saudi Arabia 19.22 32.12 25.65 English 72 
Germany 58.25 67.07 67.16 German 1,068 Singapore 34.66 33.58 35.60 English 648 
Greece 35.42 47.10 49.62 French 300 South Africa 66.17 56.74 73.06 English 1,092 
Hong Kong 30.27 33.72 35.51 English 1,800 South Korea 47.12 62.00 56.77 German 1,212 
Hungary 73.29 76.18 80.80 Socialist 48 Spain 66.26 68.54 73.82 French 696 
Iceland 29.02 20.45 36.06 Scandinavian 36 Sri Lanka 51.25 51.09 66.59 English 12 
India 47.16 51.60 57.93 English 960 Sweden 62.79 66.58 63.91 Scandinavian 660 
Indonesia 45.46 41.95 60.83 French 300 Switzerland 57.88 58.71 56.98 German 852 
Ireland 43.04 42.65 39.33 English 216 Taiwan 29.02 44.74 36.30 German 1,536 
Israel 38.44 42.65 39.33 English 168 Thailand 55.76 47.93 56.73 English 264 
Italy 52.92 53.05 62.93 French 708 Turkey 44.33 48.36 52.90 French 288 
Japan 38.18 61.62 45.47 German 5,196 United Kingdom 64.32 59.63 63.16 English 4,776 
Jordan 52.16 60.71 62.99 French 12 United States 51.91 40.22 44.17 English 14,436 
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1
 Benabou and Tirole (2010: 2) define CSR as “sacrificing profits in the social interest.” Following many other studies, 
here we adopt a broader definition of CSR that focuses on firm activities that improve social welfare but not necessarily 
at the expense of profits (or shareholder value). 
2
 For example, in Germany, corporations are legally required to take into account the interests of employees through the 
system of co-determination, which requires that employees and shareholders have an equal number of seats on the 
supervisory board (Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2015)). Moreover, the harmonization laws of the European Community 
include provisions permitting corporations to take into account the interests of creditors, customers, potential investors, 
and employees, the corporate laws in Japan presume that Japanese corporations exist within a tightly connected and 
interrelated set of stakeholders, including suppliers, customers, lending institutions, and friendly corporations (Donaldson 
and Preston (1995)). 
3
 For example, engagement in ESG may include a company’s voluntary R&D investment in an environmentally friendly 
project (the “E” dimension), an employee training program designed to increase employee welfare or productivity (the “S” 
dimension), or a voluntary increase in gender and racial diversity of the board of directors (the “G” dimension). 
Compliance with ESG may include following environmental regulations on CO2 emissions (the “E” dimension), 
guaranteeing working conditions above the minimum requirements in factories located in developing countries (the “S” 
dimension), or consulting investors on management compensation (say on pay) (the “G” dimension). 
4
 Similarly, the European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS) interprets ESG as the need to focus on: (1) 
energy efficiency, (2) greenhouse gas emissions, (3) staff turnover, (4) training and qualification, (5) maturity of 
workforce, (6) absenteeism rate, (7) litigation risks, (8) corruption, and (9) revenues from new products. 
5
 In contrast to credit rating agencies, which are paid by the firms (whose products) they rate, CSR rating agencies are 
financially independent from the rated firms and thus conflicts of interest are largely avoided.  
6
 Government databases include, for example, central bank data, U.S. Toxic Release Inventory, Comprehensive 
Environmental Response and Liability Information System (CERCLIS), and RCRA Hazardous Waste Data Management 
System. For European companies, many other information sources are available. 
7
 There are two waves of IVA data: the first wave is from 1999 to 2011, and the second wave is from 2011 to 2015. To 
match our financial data, we truncate the IVA ratings to 2014. The method for calculating the overall IVA ratings is the 
same across the two waves. The first-wave data have more detailed information on the ratings of the 29 
sub-ESG-categories. 
8
 A key ESG issue is defined as an environmental and/or social externality that has the potential to become internalized 
by the industry or the company through one or more of the following triggers: (a) pending or proposed regulation; (b) a 
potential supply constraint; (c) a notable shift in demand; (d) a major strategic response by an established competitor; or 
(e) growing public awareness or concern. Once up to five key issues have been selected, analysts work with sector team 
leaders to make any necessary adjustments to the weights in the model. Each key issue typically comprises 10% to 30% 
of the total IVA rating. The weights take into account the impact of companies, their supply chains, their products, and 
the financial implications of these impacts. For each key issue, a wide range of data are collected to address the question: 
“To what extent is risk management commensurate with risk exposure?” 
9
 For example, the CSR benefits for shareholders and creditors can be inferred from Strategic Governance, Strategic 
Capability & Adaptability, Traditional Governance Concerns, etc. CSR benefits for employees—the recognition of 
human capital—are captured by Employee Motivation Development, Labor Relations, Health & Safety, etc. The benefits 
for customers are summarized by the categories Customer Stakeholder Partnerships, Intellectual Capital & Product 
Development, Product Safety, etc. Environmental issues are crucial to all types of stakeholders. 
10
 This is confirmed by consistent CSR underperformance of firms in (current or former) socialist countries, which are 
still under an autocratic or dictatorial regime. We exclude these countries from the sample used in our main specification, 
focusing on differences between common law systems and civil law systems (and their subsystems). 
11
 Before we conducted the regression analysis, we checked the correlations between different explanatory variables to 
determine whether multicollinearity is a concern, but this is not the case. For example, the correlations between Ln(GDP 
per capita) and the legal origin dummies French Civil Origin, German Civil Origin, and Scandinavian Civil Origin are 
30.2%, 8.7% and 9.2%, respectively, and the correlations between Political Executive Constraints and the regulatory 
constraint and corruption control measures are 35.6% and 32.1%, respectively.  
12
 ESG information is available for more than 4,300 global companies based on more than 250 key performance 
indicators and more than 750 individual data points covering every aspect of sustainability reporting. The sample 
includes MSCI World, MSCI Europe, STOXX 600, NASDAQ 100, Russell 1000, S&P 500, FTSE 100, ASX 300, and 
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MSCI Emerging Market. On average, 10 years (from 2002) of history is available for most companies. 
13
 Market shares for oil and gas companies are calculated on an “in-sample” basis: all firms in the ASSET4 database with 
a CSR score are considered. When we calculate the market shares on all listed firms (on a global scale), irrespective of 
the availability of a CSR score, the results do not change. 
